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Law Summary
Missouri's Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: A New Approach to the
Cause of Conscience
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA), passed by Congress and signed by President
Clinton in 1993, was unconstitutional as applied to the states. The rationale
for this holding was based on the limits of congressional power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Refusing to accept that result, supporters
rejoined the struggle by taking the matter to state legislatures. The fruit of
their effort is a list of twelve states with either a statute or a constitutional
amendment affording increased protection to the free exercise of religion.'
This Law Summary will examine both the congressional and state efforts to
buttress religious liberty guarantees. Of primary interest here is the most
recent addition to this community: Missouri's RFRA. After outlining the
history and language of Missouri's RFRA, this Summary will provide guid-
ance for the interpretation and application of the statute in Missouri.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal RFRA and the Division of Federal Power
The federal RFRA was the product of a disagreement between Congress
and the United States Supreme Court. The Court held in Sherbert v. Verner2
and Wisconsin v. Yoder 3 that facially neutral laws encroaching on a religious
practice must pass the "compelling interest" analysis required when govern-
1. Several other state courts have interpreted their state constitution's free exer-
cise protection to demand strict scrutiny when generally applicable laws collide with
religious exercise. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. Disilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994);
People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d
393 (Minn. 1990); Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); First Covenant
Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (en banc); and State v. Miller,
549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996). See generally Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional
Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REv. 275.
2. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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mental action conflicts with a fundamental right.4 In Employment Division v.
Smith,5 when faced with a similar situation involving the religious use of a
controlled substance, the Court reconsidered and applied a "rational basis"
review.6  Congress was displeased and responded by passing the federal
RFRA. The act re-instated the "compelling interest" standard of Sherbert and
Yoder in all cases involving religious activity burdened by facially neutral
laws.7 While detractors opined about the constitutionality of the statute from
the beginning,8 several decisions were rendered in lower federal courts under
4. In analyzing the constitutionality of a workers' compensation regulation, the
Court wrote:
Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work con-
stitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the
reach of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina
Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must
be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no in-
fringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or be-
cause any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion
may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a sub-
ject within the State's constitutional power to regulate. .. ."
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))
(emphasis added). In applying Wisconsin truancy law to Amish children, the Court
states:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance be-
yond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with
the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement,
or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the in-
terest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
5. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
6. Id. at 879. Justice Scalia enunciated the Court's concern by quoting from
Supreme Court case law:
"Laws," we said, "are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices .... Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of
his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."
Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000) ("to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened").
8. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437 (1994); Marci
A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox Into the Hen-
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the federal RFRA between 1993 and 1997.9 The Supreme Court re-entered
the fray in 1997 and held RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flo-
res,10 but only as it applied to the states." The Court reminded Congress that
congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is limited to the Constitution as interpreted by the Judiciary.' 2 There-
fore, RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power in that
its restrictions clearly exceeded the scope of the liberty interests protected by
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.13
9. See infra Part II.B. 1.
10. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
11. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001). This case involved
a federal prison which denied a request for visitation by a Methodist minister and a
Buddhist inmate. Id. at 953-54. As it pertains to RFRA, the decision states that the
discussion in Boerne concerning separation of powers must be understood in its entire
context and that the holding in Boerne reaches only to Congress's power to enforce
RFRA on state and local governments. Id. at 958. Since Boerne discussed Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment powers exclusively, it could not be used to substantiate a
claim that Congress had exceeded its Article I powers as to the federal government.
Id. at 959. Overruling lower court decisions, the Tenth Circuit joined the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits in acknowledging RFRA's validity as it pertains to federal law. Id. at
958. See also Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 831-32 (9th
Cir. 1999); Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 858-59 (8th Cir.
1998).
12. Confusion is apparent concerning judicial review of RFRA. A few courts
found RFRA to be unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers doctrine.
See, e.g., In re Tessier, 190 B.R_ 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995) (finding RFRA uncon-
stitutional for forcing courts to determine questions which the Supreme Court found
nonjusticiable). The role ofjudicial review in Boerne, however, is limited to defining
what law applies to the states by means of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Boerne
Court explained that Congress had no authority to enforce the First Amendment on
state governments in contravention of the judiciary's interpretation. Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 516-19. It also clarified that the First Amendment, as interpreted by the judiciary,
was the full extent of what the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the states. Id. at
536. In other words, it was the unique blend of federal-state power and separation of
powers that made RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to the states. However, since
the corresponding federal-state power issue was not present in the case of federal law,
RFRA was a permissible limitation on federal power in excess of the constitutional
minimum. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2001).
13. The Boerne Court reminds Congress that the Fourteenth Amendment does
not allow federal regulation simply because Congress declared the regulation to be
appropriate. When the Court incorporated the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, it incorporated only the language of the
clause and its corresponding case law. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. Whereas Con-
gress is permitted to voluntarily limit its own power, it may only limit state power
under certain enunciated circumstances. Id. at 517-19. The most common Fourteenth
Amendment basis for congressional imposition on the states is section 1 which in-
cludes the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 516-17.
2004]
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B. The Emergence of State RFRAs
In the aftermath of Boerne, RFRA supporters left Washington to begin
lobbying in state capitals. Within two years of the Boerne decision, statutes
had been proposed in several states.14 Organizations traditionally considered
adverse to one another joined forces to shepherd RFRA through state legisla-
tures. 15 The results generally rewarded their efforts.
1. Federal RFRA in the Courts
In the five years between the passage of the federal RFRA and the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Boerne, a number of cases were
decided by the lower courts which interpreted and applied the law.' 6 Amid
the wide variety of factual scenarios 17 there was a common analytical process
14. States that considered and rejected RFRAs include California, Maryland and
Virginia. States enacting RFRAs will be discussed later in this summary. See infra
notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
15. "The original federal legislation was supported by one of the broadest coali-
tions ever assembled in Washington. Groups ranging from the Catholic Conference
and Evangelical Lutheran Church of America to the Muslim Public Affairs Founda-
tion and the Anti-Defamation League were in support." Missouri Senate Pension and
General Laws Committee, Witness Appearance Forms and Legislation Backgrounder
for Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, 2003 Missouri Legislative Session, at 7
(on file with the Missouri Law Review) [hereinafter Witness List].
16. The majority of cases during this period were brought in federal courts under
federal question jurisdiction. A cursory perusal through the annotations to 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 illustrates the impact this federal statute has had on state law
questions. See, e.g., Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762 (3d Cir. 1996); Goehring v. Bro-
phy, 94 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995);
Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1995); In re Three Chil-
dren, 24 F. Supp. 2d 389 (D.N.J. 1998); Show v. Patterson, 955 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Jones-Bey v. Wright, 944 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Abierta v.
City of Chicago, 949 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. 111. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Abierta v. Banks,
129 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 1997); Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
Cases involving property law, state or local prisons, or other areas of the law gener-
ally left to the state's jurisdiction are no longer governed by the federal RFRA, under-
scoring the significance of state RFRA legislation.
17. While issues of prison regulation and parole requirements were most com-
mon, other fact patterns included a state university insurance program which covered
abortion, Goehring, 94 F.3d 1294; claims involving eminent domain, Thiry v. Carl-
son, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996); local ordinances regulating charitable solicita-
tions, Gospel Missions of Am. v. Bennett, 951 F. Supp. 1429 (C.D. Cal. 1997); local
parking laws, Storm v. Town of Woodstock, 944 F. Supp. 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); a
rule prohibiting distribution of religious tracts by a first grade student, Harless v.
Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1996); and the selection of Christian music by a
choir teacher with respect to a Jewish student in the class, Bauchman v. West High
Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254 (D. Utah 1995), aff'd 132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 69
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determined by the language of RFRA. This analysis required a prima facie
showing by the plaintiff,' followed by a two-pronged test to be satisfied by
the government defendant.19
After some initial confusion, courts agreed that religious liberty claims
should be analyzed differently under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA.20
Supreme Court jurisprudence controls free exercise claims, while statutory
interpretation applies to RFRA claims.21 To invoke RFRA, the plaintiff must
show that the governmental action placed a "substantial burden" on the plain-
tiff's exercise of a sincere religious belief.22 If this threshold requirement is
not met, then no claim or defense is available under RFRA.23
If a plaintiff meets the "substantial burden" requirement, the responsibility
to produce evidence and to persuade the fact-finder shifts to the governmental
defendant who must show a "compelling governmental interest"24 which is
18. The plaintiff must identify the religious belief involved as well as the burden
imposed upon it by governmental action. The "sincerity" requirement was estab-
lished in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944), and applies to RFRA
claims as well.
19. The majority of RFRA cases deal with the government's required showing of
a compelling interest accomplished by the least restrictive means. See, e.g., Fawaad
v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470 (M.D.
Pa. 1996). While the prima facie showing required of plaintiff is not difficult to es-
tablish, the two-pronged test applied to the government under RFRA is the strictest
standard available at law. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
20. Show, 955 F. Supp. at 189 (citing Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 475 (2d
Cir. 1996)).
21. Id. ("In Jolly, the Court held that 'the O'Lone "reasonableness" test continues
to have vitality for claims brought directly under the First Amendment-for the sim-
ple reason that a congressional enactment cannot modify the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional interpretation-free exercise claims brought by prison inmates under RFRA
are subject to the compelling interest test.' In any event, the language of RFRA ex-
plicitly provides a separate cause of action apart from a constitutional claim.") (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Jolly, 76 F.3d at 475).
22. See Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Sutton v. Provi-
dence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999); Goehring, 94 F.3d 1294;
Boomer v. Irvin, 963 F. Supp. 227 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). See also Rouser v. White, 944
F. Supp. 1447, 1455 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (substantial burden for RFRA claims is the
same as substantial burden for First Amendment claims); Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp.
282, 286 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (truth of inmate's religion not justiciable and therefore not
valid basis for failing to find substantial burden), rev'd 127 F.3d 33 (5th Cir. 1997).
23. See, e.g., Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997). In this case, the inmate
was allowed access to the Bible and other religious books, but was limited to 25
books in his cell at any given time. Id. at 819-20. The court determined that these
facts did not evidence a substantial burden to the inmate's exercise of religion and
denied his RFRA claim. Id. at 820-22.
24. See Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1300 (mandatory registration fee served state uni-
versity's compelling interest in student health and well-being); In re Three Children,
24 F. Supp. 2d 389, 391-92 (D. N.J. 1998); Rigdon v. Perry, 962 F. Supp. 150, 161-62
2004]
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accomplished by the "least restrictive means., 25 This standard of review is
identical to the standard afforded "fundamental rights" under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Subsequent case law fulfilled RFRA's intent, restoring "strict
scrutiny" analysis to religious claims afforded only "rational basis" review
under Smith.
In Richmond, Virginia, a partnership of six churches challenged a city
zoning ordinance limiting their feeding and housing ministries to thirty or less
homeless persons for not more than seven days between October and April.
26
After determining that none of the three main abstention doctrines applied to
this case,27 the district court found the claim ripe for review 28 and evaluated
the propriety of a temporary restraining order. In discussing the likelihood
of success on the merits, the court held that feeding the poor was a "central
tenet" of the beliefs practiced by the churches involved, 30 establishing the
basis for further litigation and justifying the issuance of a temporary restrain-
ing order.
31
(D. D.C. 1997) (defining compelling interest in a military context); Klemka v. Nich-
ols, 943 F. Supp. 470, 478-79 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (determining validity of compelling
interest in time and manner of arrest by police). But see Abdur-Rahman v. Mich.
Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995) (constitutionally permissible time,
place, and manner restrictions need not pass the compelling interest test).
25. See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (9th Cir. 1997) (recording
suspect's sacramental confession not least restrictive means); Harris v. Chapman, 97
F.3d 499, 503-04 (11 th Cir. 1996) (hair length rule was least restrictive means of
compelling penal interest); Goehring, 94 F.3d at 1301-03 (mandatory registration fee
was least restrictive means of providing for interest in student health and well-being);
Helland v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 93 F.3d 327, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1996) (where
substitute teacher had previously discussed impermissible religious topics, removal of
the teacher from list of eligible substitutes was least restrictive means of constitutional
compliance by the school district); Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1551-54 (8th
Cir. 1996) (denying access of Native American inmate to a sweat lodge was least
restrictive means of achieving prison safety and security); Jihad v. Wright, 929 F.
Supp. 325, 330 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (placing inmate in medical isolation with inmates
who tested positive for TB was not least restrictive means of preventing the spread of
TB by inmates refusing to be tested).
26. Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D.
Va. 1996).
27. Id. at 1229-33. The abstention doctrines rejected were the Younger, Pull-
man, and Burford doctrines. Id.
28. ld. at 1233-34.
29. Id. at 1234-40.
30. Id. at 1236. The "Central Tenant" test contemplated by several courts is as
dangerous as it is unnecessary to RFRA analysis. Allowing a civil court to make
findings concerning the necessity of a particular belief within a system of belief is
precisely what the religion clauses of the First Amendment prohibit. The only inquiry
into religious belief that the Supreme Court has entrusted to the judiciary is the sincer-
ity requirement. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944).
31. Stuart Circle Parish, 946 F. Supp at 1236-37, 1241.
[Vol. 69
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Other ordinances and regulations were challenged on RFRA grounds as
well. When a first-grader in Indiana sued his school for prohibiting him from
distributing religious tracts during school, the federal district court found the
denial to be a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction which did
not violate RFRA.32 A nun employed at the Catholic University of America
sued under Title VII for sex discrimination when the university denied her
tenure, but the D.C. Circuit held that RFRA barred her Title VII claim.33 In a
suit brought by students against the University of California at Davis, the
Ninth Circuit held that the university's mandatory student registration fee
which funded, in part, a health insurance program that covered abortion satis-
fied RFRA's compelling interest test in a manner that was the least restric-
tive.34 A civil rights action, claiming that an arrest taking place at a church at
the close of a memorial service violated religious freedom, was defeated on
summary judgment when a federal district court held that the arrest had not
substantially burdened the plaintiffs exercise of religion.35  Residents of
Woodstock, New York, in the practice of holding full moon gatherings at the
"Magic Meadow," brought a RFRA claim against the city.36 The district
court held that the parking ordinance prohibiting nighttime parking along the
road near their meeting place did not substantially burden their exercise of
religion.37 In Kansas, a district court disregarded the sincerity of the beliefs
of two parents when it allowed the condemnation of property including the
grave site of plaintiffs' stillborn child on a finding that both Native American
spirituality and Christian belief permitted the moving of grave sites when
necessary. 38 And finally, a Jewish student's RFRA claim was denied because
she was allowed the right of exit from choir practices and performances
which offend her religious beliefs, but chose to participate anyway.
39
32. Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1339, 1341-42 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
33. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 457-60 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
While state RFRAs may well serve this function regarding state human rights acts,
this holding was unnecessary in the federal system. Federal courts have held since at
least 1972 that they are precluded from hearing Title VII cases involving religious
organizations and their clergy. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.
1972). This "ecclesiastical exemption" serves as a basis for a motion to dismiss,
making RFRA analysis completely unnecessary.
34. Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996).
35. Klemka v. Nichols, 943 F. Supp. 470, 472 (M.D. Penn. 1996).
36. Storm v. Town of Woodstock, 944 F. Supp. 139, 141-42 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
37. Id. at 146.
38. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996).
39. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254, 270 (D. Utah 1995), affid,
132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir. 1997). This "right of exit" approach ignores the concern
voiced in Sherbert of forcing individuals to make a cruel choice between participation
or conviction. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Since the plaintiff did not
raise the dismissal of her RFRA claim on appeal, the Tenth Circuit did not comment
2004]
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Both proponents and opponents of RFRA were especially concerned
about its impact on institutions of public education. One such case that at-
tracted widespread attention involved children belonging to the Sikh relig-
ion.4° The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion preventing a school district from enforcing a weapons ban as it applied to
students wearing ceremonial knives to school.
RFRA decisions in bankruptcy courts are of special interest because
they apply RFRA to a federal statute. The normal fact pattern presented in a
bankruptcy case involves individuals under bankruptcy protection who con-
tributed to a religious institution, usually a church, on the basis of their belief
in tithing or sacrificial giving.42 The complaint of the bankruptcy trustee
generally involves allegations of fraudulent transfers on the part of the bank-
rupt party.43 The various circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals split on
whether RFRA protected these individuals."
Inmates wasted no time in invoking RFRA protection in prison litiga-
tion. Grooming standards, 45 strip-searches, 46 cell assignments 4 and quaran-
on its application in this case. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542 (10th Cir.
1997).
40. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995). The Sikh religious re-
quirement that adherents carry ceremonial knives on their person came into conflict
with school district policy when students wore their kirpans to school. Id. at 884.
41. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the injunction imposed safety precautions and
that the school's total ban was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing safety
interests. Id. at 885-86.
42. See In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386, 390-91 (D. Idaho 1996) (finding a substantial
burden on the debtors' exercise of religion because governmental action forced a
choice between debt relief and subjecting their church to a law suit).
43. Id. at 389.
44. Compare id. and Young v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854,
863 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding RFRA as constitutional and holding that RFRA ef-
fected an amendment to the federal bankruptcy code), with In re Bloch, 207 B.R. 944,
950-51 (D. Colo. 1997) (constructive fraud provisions further compelling governmen-
tal interest and are the least restrictive means of accomplishing those interests), and In
re Newman, 203 B.R. 468, 474-75 (D. Kan. 1996) (treating tithes as fraudulent trans-
fers furthered compelling governmental interests).
45. See Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997) (prison grooming regula-
tion requiring Native American to cut his hair did not violate RFRA); May v. Bald-
win, 109 F.3d 557, 564 (9th Cir. 1997) (requiring inmate to unbraid dreadlocks during
transfers to and from prison did not violate RFRA); Davie v. Wingard, 958 F. Supp.
1244, 1249-50 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (state interest in minimizing inmate-staff contact and
avoid appearance of favoritism was sufficient defense of grooming standard against
RFRA claim); Abordo v. Hawaii, 938 F. Supp. 656, 661 (D. Hawaii 1996) (state in-
terest in inmate health and safety as well as preventing contraband smuggling was
sufficient to defend grooming standard against RFRA claim). For a case involving
grooming standards for prison staff, see Blanken v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr.,
944 F. Supp. 1359, 1361-63 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (grooming standard for male e- - 1
[Vol. 69
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tine procedures 48 all became subject to RFRA's standards. The courts re-
sponded by carefully applying 4each step in the analysis so as to minimize
disruption to the penal system. 9 One method of limiting RFRA's scope in
the prisons was to emphasize the "substantial burden" element so as to weed
out frivolous claims. 50 Another means of protecting the penal system was to
give the same deference to prison officials under RFRA's "compelling inter-
est" review that they enjoyed under Free Exercise Clause analysis. 51 The
ees satisfied "least restrictive means" requirement despite the possibility of males
using female grooming policy as it relates to long hair).
46. See Collins v. Scott, 961 F. Supp. 1009, 1016-17 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (strip-
search by female officer did not violate RFRA since the search is the least restrictive
means of accomplishing the state's interest and the gender of the guard is immaterial).
47. See Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1996) (policy of ran-
dom cell assignment supported by sufficient state interest to substantially burden
religious belief of white supremacist).
48. See Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 479 (2d Cir. 1996) (continued confine-
ment in medical keeplock was not least restrictive means of ensuring health of in-
mates when inmate in question refused to submit to tuberculosis screening test due to
his Rastafarian beliefs); Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325, 330-31 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
(confining inmate with others who had tested positive for tuberculosis after he refused
to submit to screening test was not least restrictive means of ensuring health of prison
population).
49. See, e.g., Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509-11 (11th Cir. 1996) (as-
suming, arguendo, that RFRA replaced the O'Lone test for prison free exercise with
the older Martinez test that was less stringent than strict scrutiny).
50. See Thomas D. Dillard, Note, The RFRA: Two Years Later and Two Ques-
tions Threaten Its Legitimacy, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 435 (1996). Commenting on the
application of federal RFRA by federal judges in prison cases, Dillard writes:
The substantial burden test, so far, has given judges tremendous discretion
on whether or not to apply the compelling state interest and least restric-
tive alternative requirements of the RFRA. This ambiguity on how to ap-
ply the test gives judges the ability to use the threshold issue as a masked
decision on the merits. Therefore, most judges who are hesitant to sec-
ond-guess prison administrators simply avoid the hard questions of the
RFRA by using the markedly higher threshold standard of the substantial
burden test.
Id. at 453-54.
51. See id. at 449-51. Dillard states, "[t]he RFRA has consistently been applied
to prisoners and several courts, following Congress' admonition, have indicated that it
overrules Turner and O'Lone. Nonetheless, as predicted by Senator Orin Hatch,
courts still seem to accord prison administrators considerable deference following the
Turner/O'Lone rationale." Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). In the footnote accompany-
ing this statement, Dillard further discusses Senator Hatch's comments stating, "Sena-
tor Orin Hatch made assurances that courts will still give far-reaching deference to
correction administrators and that costs of accommodation will be an important fac-
tor. He believed that 'almost all prison regulations will be held to fulfill the compel-
ling interest test."' Id. at 451 n. 115 (quoting 139 CONG. REc. S14,366-67 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch)).
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deference given to the government is limited, however, by the "least restric-
tive means" requirement.
52
2. Statutory Language of State RFRAs
After Boerne, RFRA supporters redirected their efforts toward state
capitals. The ten states enacting state RFRAs53 and Alabama, which
amended its state constitution, 54 all relied heavily on the language of the fed-
eral RFRA in shaping their provisions.
55
The federal RFRA consists of five sections. The first provides congres-
sional findings and the purpose of the statute.5 6 Second, the statute provides
52. A good example of this limitation is Jihad v. Wright, 929 F. Supp. 325, (N.D.
Ind. 1996), where the court found that placing an inmate who refused to submit to
tuberculosis testing in quarantine with inmates who had tested positive was not the
least restrictive means of preventing the spread of tuberculosis in the prison. Id. at
331. But see Dillard, supra note 50, at 454-55. Dillard comments on the application
of this prong in the Eighth Circuit as follows:
The Eighth Circuit, for instance, found a "'no greater than necessary' re-
quirement to be functionally synonymous with the 'least restrictive
means' prong of the RFRA test when applied in the prison context .... "
Thus, the least restrictive means prong of RFRA, in the prison context,
does not need to be closely fitted to the compelling interests of security,
order, and discipline. It may be that there need only be a reasonable nexus
in light of the drain on prison resources.
Id. at 454 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hamilton v. Schiro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 (8th
Cir. 1996)).
53. Act of May 19, 1999, ch. 332, § 1, 1999 Ariz. Sess. Law 1769 (codified at
ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 41-1493 (2003)); Act of June 29, 1993, No. 93-252, 1993 Conn.
Acts 801 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2000)); Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1998, ch. 98-412, 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 3296 (codified at
FLA. STAT. ch. 761.01-.05 (Supp. 2003)); Act of Feb. 1, 2001, ch. 133, § 2, 2000
Idaho Sess. Laws 352 (codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 73-401 to -404 (Michie 2003));
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, No. 90-806, 1998 I11, Laws 5014 (codified at 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-99 (2002)); New Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
ch. 17, 2000 N.M. Laws 1001 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to -5 (Michie
2000); Oklahom Religious Freedom Act, ch. 272, § 1, 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws 1181
(codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251-58 (2003)); Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, ch. 230, § 1, 1993 R.I. Pub. Laws 1017 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-1
to -4 (2002)); South Carolina Religious Freedom Act, No. 38, § 1, 1999 S.C. Acts 93
(codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to -60 (Supp. 2002)); Act of Aug. 30, 1999,
ch. 399, 1999 Tex. Sess. Laws 2511 (codified at TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 110.001-.012 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005)).
54. ALA. CONST. amend. 622.
55. For the language of state constitutions which have been interpreted to de-
mand strict scrutiny of generally applicable laws as applied to religious exercise, see
supra note 1.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
[Vol. 69
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss3/10
MISSOURI'S RFRA
its general rule and standard of review.5 7 The next section lists key defini-
tions to be used in interpreting and applying the statute.58 The final two sec-
tions explain the statute's applicability59 and its compatibility with the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
60
Though the federal RFRA provided a basic template, each state struc-
tured and worded its statutes to suit its particular situation. 6' Alabama fol-
lowed the format and substance of the federal RFRA, but required only a
simple burden on religious exercise, rather than a substantial burden,62 and
enacted its RFRA as an amendment to its state constitution.63 Connecticut
joined Alabama in relaxing the prima facie standard to a simple "burden" on
religious exercise.64 Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Oklahoma, South Caro-
lina, and Texas copied the substantial burden and strict scrutiny requirements
found in the federal RFRA.65 Rhode Island and New Mexico apply their
RFRA to laws that "restrict" religious exercise.
66
3. Interpretation of State RFRAs
The cycle of legislation is never complete until the courts have
interpreted and applied the legislative language to actual litigants. As state
RFRAs continued to emerge, the judiciary began answering questions con-
cerning the scope and nature of the protection afforded. A state-by-state sur-
vey of cases provides some context in which to evaluate Missouri's RFRA.
57. Id. § 2000bb-1.
58. Id. § 2000bb-2.
59. Id. § 2000bb-3.
60. Id. § 2000bb-4.
61. For a helpful chart explaining the substance of state RFRAs as of 2001, see
Congress Enacts Religious Land Use Law; Three More States Adopt RFRAs, SG040
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 757, 764 (2001).
62. ALA. CONST. amend. 622, § V(a) ("Government shall not burden a person's
freedom of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability...
(emphasis added).
63. It is interesting that Alabama included a severability clause in the amend-
ment. While this measure is unnecessary within the state since it is a constitutional
amendment, it could serve as protection against potential federal constitutional chal-
lenges in the United States Supreme Court.
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b(a) (2000) ("The state or any political subdivi-
sion of the state shall not burden a person's exercise of religion under section 3 of
article first of the constitution of the state even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability ... .") (emphasis added).
65. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 41-1493.01(B) (2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 761.03(1) (Supp.
2003); IDAHO CODE § 73-402(2) (Michie 2003); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15 (2001);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253(A) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
2002); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
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Illinois. The litigation created by Illinois's RFRA was predominately
concerned with local zoning ordinances. In City of Chicago Heights v. Living
Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and Ministries, Inc.,67 the Appellate
Court of Illinois decided that a city zoning ordinance intended to encourage
economic development was based on a more compelling interest than public
worship in the same sector. 68 Since most of the city was still available for the
maintenance and operation of a house of worship, the court opined, this inter-
est was accomplished by the least restrictive means.69 On further appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court fortuitously found the permit denial "arbitrary and
capricious, '70 partly reversing the appellate court but without reaching the
RFRA claim.
71
Another Illinois state claim concerning zoning was preoccupied with
72procedural issues, and five of six federal suits involving Illinois's RFRA
involved challenges to local zoning decisions.73 Two Illinois cases dealt with
67. 707 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 749 N.E.2d
916(2001).
68. Id. at 59 ("Even a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion is justi-
fied by the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system. The city has a
cognizable compelling interest to enforce its zoning laws.") (citations omitted).
69. Id. ("The ordinance only affects 40% of the city. Because the Church has
free access to a majority of the city, we conclude that the least restrictive means are
used to further the city's interest.").
70. City of Chicago Heights v. Living Word Outreach Full Gospel Church and
Ministries, Inc., 749 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. 2001). The court reasoned:
[T]he decision to deny the permit application cannot be sustained solely
on the ground that the proposed use is at odds with the comprehensive
plan. Because there is no other reason offered for denying the application,
that denial is, by definition, arbitrary and capricious and one which
"bear[s] no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, com-
fort and general welfare."
Id. at 931 (quoting La Salle Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. County of Cook, 145 N.E.2d 65
(Ill. 1957)).
71. Id. at 932 ("In light of our disposition of this appeal, we need not address
Living Word's contentions that the City violated the Illinois RFRA and the church's
constitutional rights when the city council denied the church's application for a spe-
cial use permit.").
72. See Oak Grove Jubilee Ctr., Inc. v. City of Genoa, 770 N.E.2d 1243 (Il1.
App. Ct. 2002), vacated by 808 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). During the interven-
ing time between these appellate cases, the Illinois Supreme Court decided People ex
rel. Klaeren v. Vill. of Lisle, 781 N.E.2d 223 (Ill. 2002), and denied defendant's peti-
tion for appeal directing the appellate court to reconsider in light of this new prece-
dent. Oak Grove Jubilee Ctr., Inc. v. City of Genoa, 796 N.E.2d 1059, 1059 (Ill.
2003).
73. Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, No. 03 1936, 2003 WL
22048089 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2003); Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc.
v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2003); AI-Salam Mosque Found.
v. City of Palos Heights, No. 00 C 4596, 2002 WL 535046 (N.D. 11. Apr. 5, 2002);
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RFRA in the prisons74 and one concerned the state's refusal to issue driver's
licenses without the disclosure of a social security number.
75
Florida. In Florida, the court missed the point of RFRA entirely when it
held that a challenge to a local zoning decision did not violate the statute be-
cause it regulated religious conduct and not religious belief.76  However,
when a city ordinance prohibiting the feeding of the homeless on a city beach
was challenged, a Florida appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding
that RFRA was applicable, whereas the First Amendment was not.77 Ruling
in the period following September 11, 2001, a Florida trial court found a
compelling governmental interest in taking full face photographs for driver's
C.L.U.B. v. City of Chicago, 157 F. Supp. 2d 903 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Al-Salam Mosque
Found. v. City of Palos Heights, No. 00 C 4596, 2001 WL 204772 (N.D. I11. Mar. 1,
2001).
74. Goodman v. Carter, No. 2000 C 948, 2001 WL 755137 (N.D. Ill. July 2,
2001); Diggs v. Snyder, 775 N.E.2d 40 (I11. App. Ct. 2002).
75. Mefford v. White, 770 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
76. First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 So. 2d 1114,
1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The court reasoned:
We do not agree that the County has the burden of showing it has a com-
pelling interest requiring denial of the Church's zoning request. The
United States Supreme Court, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, explained that "a law that is neutral and of general appli-
cability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even
if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious prac-
tice." In Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, the court enunciated a three-part
test to determine whether there has been a violation of the constitutional
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause (which Florida's Act is obviously
designed to protect): (1) the ordinance must regulate religious conduct,
not belief; (2) the law must have a secular purpose and secular effect; and
(3) once these threshold tests are met, the court must balance the compet-
ing governmental and religious interests.
Id. (citation omitted). In reasoning this way, the court applied First Amendment Free
Exercise analysis in place of RFRA. This is obviously erroneous for two reasons:
first, if Free Exercise protection is already available then the statute is surplusage;
second, RFRA has been found to require separate analysis from Free Exercise claims
in every other jurisdiction and is specifically intended to apply to cases in which the
Free Exercise Clause does not provide the compelling interest standard. For cases
demonstrating the separate analyses, see Mefford v. White, 770 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2002); Goodman v. Carter, No. 2000 C 948,2001 WL 755137 (N.D. I11. July
2, 2001); First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 So. 2d 1114 (Fl.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Roles v. Townsend, 64 P.3d 338 (Id. Ct. App. 2003); Steele v.
Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); Scott v. State, 80 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2002).
77. Abbott v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 783 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001). After ordering the city to find an alternative site on public property for the
feeding program, the trial judge refused to consider the appropriateness of the selected
site. Id. at 1215. The appellate court disagreed and remanded with instructions that
the lower court evaluate the propriety of the site provided by the city. Id.
2004]
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78licenses in spite of plaintiffs Islamic practice concerning head coverings.
With respect to prisons, a Florida appellate court affirmed a trial court deter-
mination that the state should be given a reasonable amount of time to proc-
ess the name change of a prisoner before allowing him to travel using that
name, even if the name change was religiously motivated.79 In a federal suit
exercising supplemental jurisdiction, a Florida district court found that a
city's prohibition on vertical grave decorations did not burden the plaintiffs
exercise of religion as required by RFRA's threshold test.80
Texas. The Texas RFRA was invoked in an action filed by a Christian
school that had been shut down by the city of Abilene for building code viola-
tions.81 While the court found the Act inapplicable based on an historical
note concerning the effective date of the statute,82 the facts of the case would
likely have allowed enforcement of the code for public safety reasons.83 In a
Texas case involving the exclusion of private schools from an interscholastic
athletic association, the court failed to find a burden on the exercise of relig-
ion.84 Another Texas case failed to find a burden on the exercise of religion
78. Freeman v. Florida, No. 2002-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
June 6, 2003). Plaintiff had obtained a Florida driver's license on February 21, 2001
with her picture revealing only her eyes. Id. at * 1. She received notice on November
28, 2001 that her license would be revoked on December 18, 2001 unless she
submitted to a photograph without her veil. Id. The state offered to give maximum
privacy to plaintiff when taking the photo, and argued that the license would not need
to be seen by anyone except law enforcement officials. Id. at *3.
79. Yasir v. Singletary, 766 So. 2d 1197, 1198-99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
80. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
81. Christian Acad. of Abilene v. City of Abilene, 62 S.W.3d 217, 218-20 (Tex.
App. 2001).
82. Id. at 219. The historical note referenced by the decision states: "This Act
applies only to a cause of action that accrues on or after the effective date of this Act."
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.002 note (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (His-
torical and Statutory Notes). Missouri's RFRA, like the federal RFRA and unlike
Texas' RFRA, applies retroactively to violations pre-dating the effective date of the
statute. Compare id. with Mo. REv. STAT § 1.307.1 (Supp. 2003).
83. According to the opinion, "[tihe City of Abilene asserted and the trial court
found that the building used by the Academy for school purposes violated city ordi-
nances by failing to meet certain life-safety measures and that the building created a
substantial danger of injury or adverse health impact." Id. at 218. It is unlikely that
the health and safety of school age children are less than compelling interests, or that
building codes are too restrictive a means of accomplishing this purpose.
84. Jesuit Coll. Preparatory Sch. v. Judy, 231 F. Supp. 2d 520, 523, 536 (N.D.
Texas 2002), vacated as moot by No. 02-10174, 2003 WL 23323003 (5th Cir. Feb.
26, 2003). The athletic association voluntarily modified its rules to allow private
school participation, which prompted the Fifth Circuit to dismiss the appeal as moot.
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resulting from a court order requiring a mentally ill individual to take psy-
choactive medications.
85
Connecticut. A Connecticut court found that a prison policy refusing to
change the label on an inmate's file to reflect a new legal name, rather than
listing the new name as an alias, served a compelling governmental interest
accomplished by the least restrictive means.8 6 In a zoning case, another trial
court decided inexplicably that Connecticut's RFRA only applied to general
rules that were pretextual s7 In a related case, a Connecticut appellate court
affirmed a lower court's dismissal of an appeal where a local historic preser-
vation authority had denied a church a certificate of appropriateness to install
vinyl siding.88 Though federal courts have been presented with several reli-
85. In re R.M., 90 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tex. App. 2002) ("R.M.'s testimony failed
to show that the trial court's order substantially burdened her free exercise of religion.
We need not, therefore, determine whether the State had sufficiently shown a compel-
ling interest.").
86. Outlaw v. Warden, No. CV000802033, 2001 WL 418561, at *1 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. Mar. 30, 2001). While this case involves a petty dispute over which name
gets printed where, the responsibility to accommodate rests on the government, not
the inmate, under RFRA.
87. Farmington Ave. Baptist Church v. Farmington Planning & Zoning Comm'n,
No. CV010811563S, 2003 WL 21771916, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July, 9, 2003). The
court explained its rationale in a footnote:
The church has also argued that state and federal statutes require the
commission to avoid restrictions on religion and, if free exercise of relig-
ion is at stake, to take the least restrictive means of accomplishing a com-
pelling government interest. I agree with the commission on this issue.
Secular concerns such as safety do not impinge on the exercise of religion,
assuming, of course, that the recitation of such concerns is not a mere pre-
text. Our case law already establishes a heightened scrutiny as to the
more general and less quantitative considerations. The statutes seeking to
preserve the value of freedom of religion can peacefully coexist with zon-
ing regulations regarding safety, traffic, and the like, so long as those con-
cerns are not used to mask discriminatory intent.
Id. at *5 n.4 (citations omitted). This analysis fails to appreciate the historical and
express intent of RFRA as it relates to laws of general applicability. In the wake of
the Smith decision, the Supreme Court found the use of facially neutral laws as a
pretext for religious discrimination to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
RFRA was enacted to address religious exercise not protected under the post-Smith
Free Exercise Clause.
88. First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 737 A.2d 989,
989 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). The appellate court simply affirmed by reference to the
analysis of the lower court. Id. at 990. The trial court, while not referring to RFRA
or applying typical RFRA analysis, ultimately found that putting siding on a church
building did not qualify as an exercise of religion and, thus, no burden on the free
exercise of religion existed. First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Historic Dist.
Comm'n, 738 A.2d 224, 231 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) ("The commission's decision,
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gious exercise claims in Connecticut, they have refused to apply Connecti-
cut's RFRA. 9
Oklahoma. An interesting case in Oklahoma held that a prison's failure
to assign a Muslim inmate to a cell with another Muslim neither violated the
Free Exercise Clause nor placed a substantial burden on the inmate's free
exercise of religion as required by RFRA.90 What is intriguing about the
case, however, is the footnote applying the Lemon Test to a RFRA claim.9 1
This application of an Establishment Clause test to a Free Exercise issue is
inexcusable error as well as the source of much confusion in applying the
Free Exercise Clause, and now RFRA as well.92
Idaho. Idaho's RFRA has likewise been invoked by a prison inmate.
93
An Idaho appellate court held that the prison system's no-tobacco policy
however, has not interfered with the right of the plaintiff or its members to express
their religious views, or associate or assemble for that purpose."). This result is puz-
zling since government control of a religious group's facilities cannot help but burden
its ability to function. While City of Boerne had similar facts, it is important to re-
member that it was decided solely under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
89. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 193 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Conn. 2002); Quental v.
Connecticut Comm'n on the Deaf & Hearing Impaired, 122 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.
Conn. 2000).
90. Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99, 102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003).
91. Id. at 102 n. 1. The footnote relies on the decisions in Kilaab al Ghashiyah v.
Department of Corrections, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis. 2003) and Madison v.
Riter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003), rev'd 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003),
which held that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
was unconstitutional by applying the Lemon test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971). Steele, 76 P.3d at 102 n.l. The effect of this type of analysis is to make
enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause a violation of the Establishment Clause
which is illogical and unworkable. See Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First
Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883,
892 (2001) ("Arguing a clash-of-the-Clauses is to advance the wholly improbable:
that the Framers drafted an Amendment with two fundamental guarantees side-by-
side, each trying to cancel out the other."). For an in-depth discussion of the concept
of a clash between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, see id. at
890-94.
92. "It is logically impossible for one Religion Clause to clash with the other if
the purpose of each Clause was to independently 'carve out' an exception to existing
governmental power.... [I]t is quite impossible for these Clauses to conflict when
both are negating governmental power." Esbeck, supra note 91, at 893 (footnote
omitted). RFRA, like the Religion Clauses, is a rule which "negatives" governmen-
tal power. This makes a conflict between the Establishment Clause and RFRA
impossible.
93. Roles v. Townsend, 64 P.3d 338 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003).
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served a compelling governmental interest. The court further held that the
policy utilized the least restrictive means.
94
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Legislative History of Missouri's RFRA
The motivating forces behind the scene in Jefferson City were similar to
those previously at work on Capitol Hill. The organizations involved in-
cluded conservative religious institutions and liberal civil liberties groups.95
Both camps saw RFRA as an additional defense against government actions
perceived to be increasingly hostile to religion.96 This alliance of liberal and
conservative forces, while rare by contemporary standards, resembled similar
94. Id. at 339. The state stipulated to the inmate's claim that tobacco smoking
was essential to the practice of his Native American beliefs. This is a routine means
of avoiding the question of what constitutes a "sincerely held" religious belief. To
highlight the difficulty faced by courts when evaluating the legitimacy of religious
beliefs, this plaintiff claimed that "[h]e desire[d] to smoke tobacco for the purification
of body and spirit and to keep away evil and sickness." Id. While the public at large
understands the health hazards of tobacco smoking, the courts are to look to the sin-
cerity of the individual's belief rather than passing judgment on its wisdom or valid-
ity. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the appropriate test is sin-
cerity. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
95. A page entitled "Missouri RFRA Coalition Partners" included in the Witness
List, listed the following organizations as proponents of Missouri's RFRA: American
Anglican Church, Diocese of the Nativity; American Jewish Committee; American
Jewish Congress, West Central Region; American United for Separation of Church
and State, St. Louis Chapter; Anti-Defamation League; Christian Science Committee
on Publication for Missouri; Greek Orthodox Diocese of Chicago (includes the St.
Louis area); Hadassah, St. Louis Chapter; Home School Legal Association; Interfaith
Alliance of Greater St. Louis; Jewish Community Relations Council; Jewish Commu-
nity Relations Bureau/American Jewish Committee of Greater Kansas City; Missouri
Baptist Convention; Missouri Family Network; Missouri Conference, United Church
of Christ; NA'AMAT USA; Prison Fellowship; Religious Freedom Alliance; Seventh
Day Adventist Church; Union of American Hebrew Congregation Midwest Council;
Interfaith Partnership Cabinet Faith Communities; Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church; The National Conference for Community and Justice; St. Louis Society of
Friends; St. Louis Metro Baptist Association; St. Louis Rabbinical Association; St.
Louis Association Council of the United Church of Christ; Vedanta Society of St.
Louis. Missouri RFRA Coalition Partners, in Witness List, supra note 15, at 8.
96. Though allied in their political goal, these groups were motivated by differ-
ent ultimate purposes. The conservatives were interested in protections benefiting
conservative Christian churches, such as zoning exceptions. The liberals were con-
cerned with protecting under-represented religious communities.
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alliances formed for the purpose of disestablishing religion in various states
during the period of the early republic.
97
The idea of a RFRA in Missouri was not new in 2003.98 Senate Bill
551, proposed in 2000, first suggested increased protection for religious exer-
cise in Missouri. 99 The following year, RFRA was introduced as Senate Bill
337100 In 2002, Senate Bills 958 and 657, as well as House Bill 1801, were
proposed to the Missouri General Assembly. 0'I On December 1, 2002, Sen-
ate Bill 12 was pre-filed and re-introduced the language of its antecedents
requiring the same strict standard as the federal RFRA.10 2 After some modi-
fication, the House Committee Substitute to Senate Bill 12 was finally
passed, 10 3 and Governor Holden signed it into law on July 9, 2003.' 04 Mis-
souri's RFRA took legal effect on August 28, 2003.'05
97. See SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF
CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 27-35 (1963). For example, Mead writes:
Hence came that apparently strange coalition of rationalists with pietistic-
revivalistic sectarians during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
Together, they provided much of the propelling energy behind the final
thrust for the religious freedom that was written into the constitution of
the new nation. This coalition seems less strange if we keep in mind that
at the time, religious freedom was for both more a practical and legal
problem than a theoretical one. They agreed on the practical goal.
Id. at 35.
98. The bills mentioned in this paragraph were obtained from the Missouri Sen-
ate official web site at http://www.senate.state.mo.us. In the interest of creating a
permanent and complete record of the history of RFRA in Missouri, these bills have
also been printed and are on file with the Missouri Law Review. This record, along
with various other papers concerning the history of RFRA, will collectively be cited,
hereinafter, as The Kinder File.
99. S. 551, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000).
100. S. 337, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001).
101. S. 958 & 657, 91st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2002) (on file with the
Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File, supra note 98, at 18-19).
102. The original form of Senate Bill 12 required the "least restrictive means" and
provided an exception only for "federal, state, or local civil rights law." S. 12, 92d
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003) (on file with the Missouri Law Review, in
The Kinder File, supra note 98, at 38-39).
103. Rep. Richard Byrd wrote a short article discussing some of the questions
considered by the House of Representatives before agreeing on the final language of
their substitute for the Senate bill. See Richard G. Byrd, Missouri's Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act: The Impact on Municipal Regulations, Mo. MuN. REV., Aug.
2003, at 9.
104. See 2003 Regular Session Legislative Action taken by Governor Bob Hol-
den, available at http://www.gov.state.mo.us/legis03/laf07l103.htm (last visited Aug.
11, 2003).
105. See Senate Bill 12 (2003) Bill Summary, available at
http://www.senate.state.mo.us/03INFO/bills/SB012.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2003).
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Three sessions of debate generated two points particularly worthy of
consideration. First, the language included in the civil rights exception to
Missouri's RFRA was the result of fiscal analysis and not floor debate. A
technical memo concerning the fiscal analysis of the 2002 bills states simply
that including the exception would "avert the potential loss of federal
funds."'1 6 A similar memo involving Senate Bill 12 explains the putative
dilemma in more detail. 10 7 Since federal law requires state human rights stat-
utes to provide at least as much protection as their federal counterparts,1
0 8
federal funding for some state programs could be jeopardized by interpreting
RFRA to allow less protection than federal law.' 0 9 This potential conflict was
theoretical,' 10 but was deemed troublesome enough by lawmakers to cause a
civil rights exception to the legislation in both sessions. III
106. Fiscal Estimate Worksheet Technical Memorandum from Analyst Daniel L.
Hays on Fiscal Note FN 3812-03N, Bill No. SCS SB 958 & 657 (Jan. 28, 2002) (on
file with the Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File, supra note 98, at 25). The
memo fails to provide a citation to the referenced federal law.
107. Fiscal Estimate Worksheet Technical Memorandum from Analyst Tammy
Cavender on Fiscal Note 0406-01N, Bill No. SB 12 (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file with the
Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File, supra note 98, at 43). As with the first
memo, this memo fails to cite the relevant authority upon which its concern is based.
108. In the absence of a citation by the analysts, it is difficult to know the provi-
sion to which they are referring. One possibility is 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (2000),
which prohibits officials granting federal funds from giving grants to programs or
activities that are not consistent with the purposes of the federal law providing the
funds.
109. Fiscal Estimate Worksheet Technical Memorandum from Analyst Tammy
Cavender, supra note 107. Ms. Cavander's description of the technical error states:
As long as the language in section 1.307.2 is included specfically [sic] as
"except that nothing in these sections shall be construed to establish or
eliminate a defense to a civial [sic] action or criminal prosecution based
on federal, state or local civil right law" then the adoption of this bill will
not have any effect on the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. This
section is critical. Without it, the Missouri Human Rights Act would be
open to interpriations [sic] that provide less protection than federal law.
Federal Law requires state civial [sic] rights acts to provide equal or
greater protection than federal law in order to be valid. This could lead to
sections of the act being declared invalid and to the loss of federal funds.
The MHRA, [sic] must provide substantially equivalent protection as fed-
eral law to be eligable [sic] for federal funds.
Id.
110. To say that increased protection of religious liberty could violate civil rights
laws seems illogical. In the case of Title VII employment regulation, religious institu-
tions are exempted from the ban on religious discrimination, but required to comply
with other categories. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).
111. What troubled the legislature in this analysis, of course, was the potential
loss of federal funds.
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The more contentious debate concerned the application of RFRA to the
corrections system. The history of litigation arising in the prison context
under federal and state RFRAs excited fear in corrections circles concerning
the impact of a Missouri RFRA on their facilities and administration.' 1 2 The
fiscal analysis reflected the fear of increased litigation by estimating the an-
nual cost of the statute to be over $100,000 in the years following its imple-
mentation. 3 Amendments to the bill were proposed that would retain the
rational-basis review standard from Smith in cases involving penal institu-
tions. 1 4 Advocates and some legislators failed to see the feared harm and
112. Mickey Wilson, Fiscal Note for Perfected SB 12 (Apr. 16, 2003) (on file
with the Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File, supra note 98, at 50-54). In-
cluded in his assumptions, Mr. Wilson provides the following:
Officials from the Department of Corrections (DOC) stated that the
proposal would essentially create a law guaranteeing a person's free exer-
cise of religion. Officials assume DOC would not be able to have any re-
strictions on incarcerated offenders unless there were a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in the least restrictive means. DOC states the least re-
strictive means of providing free exercise of inmates' religious beliefs
could require additional personnel to provide inmates the religious ser-
vices of their choosing and varied religious paraphernalia. Additional
meeting space may be required, which could therefore require capital im-
provements. The least restrictive means to provide for special dietary re-
quirements could require operation of separate food service/dining opera-
tions which could also require capital improvements. These requirements
could very well apply to each facility operated by the DOC and the burden
would be on the Department to provide these things.
DOC states that additional inmates could challenge DOC regulations in
state court and issues which have been decided in federal court could be
relitigated in state court. An individual would be competent and sufficient
by themselves to determine and establish a religious practice under the re-
ligious exercise clause. There would no longer be a necessity for a prac-
tice or belief to be endorsed by a larger religious community before the
DOC would be required to allow/facilitate the expression of [an] individu-
als' [sic] religious practices.
DOC assumes the various components of this bill, and their potential
for excessive fiscal impact, would result in unknown costs to the DOC
which could very well exceed $100,000 per year. DOC notes that these
same concerns would likely hold true for jails throughout the state.
Oversight agrees that the same issues could apply to jails operated by
political subdivisions.
Oversight assumes any additional costs related to the Department of
Corrections and political subdivisions would not occur until FY 2005.
Id. at 51-52.
113. Id. at 50-53.
114. Unnumbered Senate Amendment to Senate Bill 12, offered by Sen. Kennedy
of the 3rd District (on file with The Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File, supra
note 98, at 42). The amendment provides:
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resisted the amendments, believing instead that the legitimate interests of the
corrections system are "compelling" under the statute and that no negative
impact was expected. 115 One advocate pointed out that state prison systems
were already required to meet the compelling interest test with respect to the
exercise of religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
1.309. A governmental authority may not restrict an inmate's or pris-
oner's free exercise of religion unless it demonstrates that the application
of the restriction to an inmate held in a state correctional facility or pris-
oner held in a county or municipal jail is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests and otherwise meets all criteria set forth by the
United States Supreme Court.
Id.
115. A memo dated February 12, 2002 from Jeff Davis, Senator Kinder's General
Counsel, to staff attorney Cindy Kadlec requesting a new draft of the 2002 version of
RFRA expresses the legislative doubts which lingered throughout the 2003 session,
stating:
I do not want any of the corrections language included. Please analyze the
DOC fiscal comments and please tell me what you think. My impression,
without much research, is that they are making a mountain out of a mole
hill. I fail to see how the "compelling state interest test" will allow in-
mates to violate state or federal statutes regarding drug laws, fire codes,
the health and welfare of other inmates, etc. or that they would be permit-
ted to have conjugal.., visits or animal sacrifice.
Memorandum from Jeff Davis to Cindy Kadlec (Feb. 12, 2002) (on file with the Mis-
souri Law Review, in The Kinder File, supra note 98, at 28). Karen Aroesty, of the
Anti-Defamation League, in an e-mail to Jeff Davis dated February 13, 2002 ad-
dresses DOC concerns frontally:
If I'm not mistaken, DOC is already paying per diems for chaplains from
different religious denominations to visit the prisons. They would likely
not need new personnel in that regard for religious services. Their belief
that the law will "guarantee" a person's free exercise of religion doesn't
take into consideration all the things they are already doing, thus making
null the argument that they will be having to do so much more. RFRA
would not require that they have separate food operations; no capitol [sic]
improvement are likely necessary. I would be interested in knowing how
many prisoners in Missouri, for instance, are suing for the right to keep
Kosher, and what impact that has had. As regards the individual being
competent by themselves to determine and establish a religious practice,
that concern also holds no water. People still need to establish under cur-
rent caselaw that they have reasonable and legitimate beliefs. Prison offi-
cials have a big factor riding in their favor that will likely trump any ri-
diculous or particularly burdensome religious request-that is-the issue
of security and maintaining accountability to the community at large.
That is going to be a very, very compelling interest for any judge, and will
rest very much in the prison system's interest.
E-mail from Karen Aroesty, Regional Director, Anti-Defamation League, to Jeff
Davis (Feb. 13, 2002) (on file with the Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File,
supra note 98, at 31).
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sons Act (RLUIPA).11 6 Thus, Missouri's RFRA would not impose upon Mis-
souri's jails and prisons a burden they were not already required to bear.
RFRA supporters alleged that heavy-handed corrections policies that were
suppressing legitimate prison ministry and religious activity by inmates were
a greater concern than unfounded fears of the cost of compliance.' 17 The
resulting House Committee Substitute language sufficiently satisfied these
competing interests and won passage in both houses of the legislature."
8
B. The Text of Missouri's RFRA
The intentional and specific wording of Missouri's RFRA was the result
of the legislature's critical analysis of the standard RFRA language. 19 Mis-
souri's RFRA is codified in two sections of Chapter 1 of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri.120 The first of these sections provides the standard of review and
two definitions.' 2' The standard of review prohibits governmental interfer-
ence with the "free exercise of religion" unless the government satisfies a
116. Karen Aroesty wrote to Jeff Davis:
The DOC must by now be aware of the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), a measure designed to ensure
that government not interfere with an individual's freedom to practice
his/her religion unless the highest governmental interest is at stake.... [I]t
provides protection for religious observances of prisoners and other insti-
tutionalized persons without compromising appropriate institutional con-
cerns about security....
... The nature of their accommodation, which they must do now under
RLUIPA anyway, will not require anyone to build anything or to expend
substantial amounts of money.
E-mail from Karen Aroesty, Regional Director, Anti-Defamation League, to Jeff
Davis (Feb. 13, 2002) (on file with the Missouri Law Review, in The Kinder File,
supra note 98, at 29).
117. Again, an e-mail from Karen Aroesty to Jeff Davis, gives a specific example
when it states, "[a]mong the examples of unfair restrictions on prisoners . . . at con-
gressional hearings were cases in which prison officials not only refused to purchase
Passover matzo for the 8 days of the Passover holiday, they refused to accept donated
matzo from a Jewish organization."
Id.
118. Missouri Revised Statute Section 1.307.4 (Supp. 2003) provides:
"Relevant circumstances" may include legitimate penological interests
needed to protect the safety and security of incarcerated persons and cor-
rectional facilities, but shall not include reasonable requests by incarcer-
ated individuals for the opportunity to pray, reasonable access to clergy,
use of religious materials that are not violent or profane, and reasonable
dietary requests.
Id.
119. See Byrd, supra note 103, at 9.
120. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 1.302, 1.307.
121. Id. at § 1.302.
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two-pronged exception. 122 The first prong requires the state law in question
to be a "rule of general applicability" which does "not [intentionally] dis-
criminate against religion, or among religions."' 23 The second prong forces
the government to demonstrate (a) "a compelling governmental interest"
which (b) "is not unduly restrictive considering the relevant circum-
stances."1 24 This final phrase is a departure from other RFRAs. It is calcu-
lated to grant more flexibility to the government than the familiar "least re-
strictive means" requirement.' 25
In order to bring clarity to the act, the statute defines two terms: "exer-
cise of religion" and "demonstrates." "Exercise of religion" is "an act or
refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious belief."' 26 This reli-
gious belief need not be "compulsory or central" to the individual's religious
worldview. 127 "Demonstrates" is used in RFRA to mean "meet[ing] the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence and [meeting the burden] of persua-
sion.
122. Id. at§ 1.302.1.
123. Id. at § 1.302.1(1). This requirement is a reminder that laws which facially
discriminate against a religious practice or belief should be challenged on state and
federal constitutional grounds.
124. Id. at § 1.302.1(2). The "not unduly restrictive considering the relevant cir-
cumstances" standard was not based on previous case law or statute, but was meant to
establish a case-by-case evaluation of each claim examining the totality of the cir-
cumstances before determining whether the governmental action was appropriate.
Telephone Interview with Rep. Richard G. Byrd, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, Missouri General Assembly (Sept. 29, 2003).
125. Byrd, supra note 103.
126. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.302.2.
127. Id. This part of the definition prevents the courts from making determina-
tions concerning what doctrines or practices are central to a particular religious sys-
tem. Since diversity of religious belief and practice is common even within one reli-
gious community, fact-finding efforts by the courts concerning the centrality of a
belief or practice would inevitably result in Establishment Clause violations. See
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,
715-16 (1981). The correct analysis asks whether the practice in question was moti-
vated by religious belief, instead of asking whether or not the practice is mandatory
according to that belief. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451, Lee, 455 U.S. at 257, Thomas,
450 U.S. at 715-16. This is why Congress amended the federal RFRA, when it en-
acted RLUIPA, eliminating the "central tenet" requirement. Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803.
128. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302.3. In other words, once the plaintiff has met the
burden of pleading and the threshold showing of a "burden" on the free exercise of
religion, the government must bear the burdens of production and persuasion in meet-
ing the standard set out in RFRA.
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The second section of the statute defines which laws are subject to the
act.' 29 It then carves out exceptions to the general rule. The first exception
prevents Missouri's RFRA from applying to any civil rights claim.' 30 The
next subsection prevents RFRA from "allowing any person to cause physical
injury to another person," authorizing the possession of an otherwise unlaw-
ful weapon, or allowing a failure to pay child support or provide medical
treatment to a child under life-threatening conditions.' 31 The final subsection
clarifies the application of RFRA within the prison system.' 3 2
IV. DISCUSSION
While federal case law and decisions from sister states are informative
in interpreting a new statute, the absence of congressional power announced
in Boerne also encourages the states to use their own bodies of law to shape
their case law. Since the primary purpose of all RFRAs is to apply free exer-
cise analysis to laws of general applicability, Missouri courts may find guid-
ance in the cases interpreting and applying the free exercise clause of the
Missouri Constitution. After examining Missouri's free exercise provision
and its application by the courts, applying this jurisprudence to a series of
hypothetical RFRA suits will aid in understanding Missouri's RFRA.
A. Free Exercise and No-Establishment in the Missouri Constitution
Like many other state constitutions, Missouri's Bill of Rights is Article I
of the constitution's body.' 33 Section 5 provides for the religious liberty of
129. Id. at § 1.307.1 ("Sections 1.302 and this section apply to all state and local
laws, resolutions and ordinances and the implementation of such laws, resolutions,
and ordinances, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after
August 28, 2003.").
130. Id. at § 1.307.2 ("Nothing in sections 1.302 and this section shall be con-
strued to authorize any government to burden any religious belief, except that nothing
in these sections shall be construed to establish or eliminate a defense to a civil action
or criminal prosecution based on a federal, state, or local civil rights law.").
131. Id. at § 1.307.3 ("Nothing in sections 1.302 and this section shall be con-
strued as allowing any person to cause physical injury to another person, to possess a
weapon otherwise prohibited by law, to fail to provide monetary support for a child or
to fail to provide health care for a child suffering from a life threatening condition.").
132. Id. at § 1.307.4 ("'Relevant circumstances' may include legitimate penologi-
cal interests needed to protect the safety and security of incarcerated persons and
correctional facilities, but shall not include reasonable requests by incarcerated indi-
viduals for the opportunity to pray, reasonable access to clergy, use of religious mate-
rials that are not violent or profane, and reasonable dietary requests.").
133. The Missouri Constitution is organized into thirteen articles outlining the
structure and function of government within the state. Of interest to this Law Sum-
mary are Article I (Bill of Rights), Article V (Judiciary), and Article IX (Education).
Including a Bill of Rights or Declaration of Rights within the body of the state consti-
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Missouri citizens much the way the federal Free Exercise Clause does in the
First Amendment. 34 Sections 6 and 7, read together, prevent the government
from forcing any particular religious system or practice on its citizens or of-
fering direct financial support to any religious entity.' 35 The language pre-
venting the state from funding religion is repeated again in Article IX's provi-
sions on education.
36
Unlike the no-establishment sections, but similar to RFRA, Article I,
section 5 provides the government with some exceptions to the general rule of
tution is a practice used by many states. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I; COLO. CONST.
art. II; CONN. CONST. art. I; HAW. CONST. art. I; LA. CONST. art. I; MASS. CONST. pt. I;
N.Y. CONST. art. I; OHIO CONST. art. I; TEX. CONST. art. I; VA. CONST. art. I; WASH.
CONST. art. I.
134. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5. This section is titled, "Religious freedom-liberty of
conscience and belief-limitations" and is taken from Article II, Section 5 of Mis-
souri's 1875 Constitution. It reads:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no human au-
thority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no per-
son shall, on account of his religious persuasion or belief, be rendered in-
eligible to any public office or trust or profit in this state, be disqualified
from testifying or serving as a juror, or be molested in his person or estate;
but this section shall not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor
to justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the
state, or with the rights of others.
Id.
135. Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7. Section 6, entitled "Practice and support of relig-
ion not compulsory-contracts therefor enforceable," states:
That no person can be compelled to erect, support or attend any place or
system of worship, or to maintain or support any priest, minister, preacher
or teacher of any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion; but if
any person shall voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall
be held to performance of the same.
Id. Section 7, entitled "Public aid for religious purposes-preferences and discrimina-
tions on religious grounds," says:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or in-
directly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of
any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no pref-
erence shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church,
sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.
Id.
136. Nestled in Article IX's rules for education, the Missouri constitution extends
its no-establishment policy even further. See Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 8. Closely resem-
bling the failed federal "Blaine Amendment" of that same year, Section 8 prohibits
the use of any government funds for any religious purpose whatsoever. Id. The pro-
vision is very similar to Sections 6 and 7 of Article I, and has been interpreted by the
Missouri Supreme Court to extend further than the federal Establishment Clause.
Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (citing Paster v.
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97, 101-02 (Mo. 1974) (en banc)).
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religious liberty. 137 Regulation of religious practices which amount to "acts
of licentiousness" or "practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or
safety of the state, or with the rights of others" is allowed. These excep-
tions, which originated in the 1875 Missouri constitution,' 39 acknowledge that
religion must not be used as an excuse for behavior that is a clear and present
harm to public order.
40
In applying constitutional protections to religious property use, three
cases are of particular interest. In Congregation Temple Israel v. City of
Creve Coeur, after acknowledging the applicability of the federal religion
clauses to the states,1 42 the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned that the protec-
tion of religious exercise by both the state and federal constitutions precluded
any legislative intent to empower a municipality to regulate a church's use of
land. 143 The court did, however, acknowledge the delegated authority of a
municipality to regulate land use by churches in matters involving public
health and safety.'" Expanding on this precedent, the court of appeals held
137. The exceptions found in Missouri's constitution are typical of state constitu-
tions dating back as far as the beginning of the republic. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art.
I (the Declaration of Rights constitutes Article I of the constitution); MD. CONST.
Declaration of Rights (the Declaration of Rights stands alone within the Constitution);
MASS. CONST. pt. I (the constitution is divided into "Parts," the first of which is the
Declaration of Rights). These provisions were meant to define the limitations on
religious behavior previous to the incorporation of the Free Exercise clause into the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Though overshadowed by the federal constitution now, these
exceptions still provide state courts with analogous analyses in applying Missouri's
RFRA.
138. MO. CONST. art. I, § 5.
139. Id. The annotations to this section cite the source of this language as Mo.
CONST. art. 2, § 5 (1875).
140. The exceptions listed in this section are essentially concrete expressions of
the abstract "compelling interest" standard. Rather than arguing the government's
compelling interest in health to justify regulation of ritualistic animal slaughter, this
section specifically excepts threats to public safety, which would include health risks.
141. 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
142. Id. at 454 ("The provision of the First Amendment that 'Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof has been made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment."). The
court cites Cantwell and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), in support of
this assertion. Congregation Temple, 320 S.W.2d at 454.
143. Congregation Temple, 320 S.W.2d at 454 ("[W]e do not believe our legisla-
ture in using the language it did, in Section 89.020, had any intention of granting
authority to municipalities to restrict location and use of buildings and land for
churches.").
144. Id. at 456 ("[M]unicipalities under the police power have the power of regu-
lation of the facilities of public schools, and we hold the same thing is true of
churches, such as safety of boilers, smokestacks and similar facilities, sanitation,
manner and type of construction for fire protection and certainly likewise off-street
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in Village Lutheran Church v. City of Ladue,145 that the enabling statute "does
not give municipalities zoning power over churches."' 146 Three years later,
when the damages portion of the suit returned on appeal, 147 the court reiter-
ated the circumstances under which municipalities could permissibly regulate
religious land use by means of zoning 148 and cited federal case law in sup-
port.' 49 However, in Association for Educational Development v. Hayward'50
the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a municipal zoning decision preventing a
priest and six laymen from erecting and residing in a dwelling built on prop-
erty zoned for single-family occupancy because a monastery or parish-house,




Three other state cases also deserve mention. Mrs. Baird, a Christian
Science practitioner, treated disease as a spiritual ailment rather than a physi-
cal one.152 In City of Kansas City v. Baird,153 her conviction for failure to
report a case of diphtheria, as required by ordinance, was held by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court to be unrelated to her free exercise of religion. 54 In
parking facilities, sewage disposal and other matters related to the public health,
safety and welfare.") (citations omitted).
145. 935 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) ("Village Lutheran I").
146. Id. at 722.
147. Vill. Lutheran Church v. City of Ladue, 997 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999) ("Village Lutheran II").
148. Id. at 508 ("Village Lutheran I, however, does not stand for the proposition
that municipalities may never regulate the use of property by churches or that
churches need never seek approval from municipalities to engage in certain conduct.
Rather, Village Lutheran I recognizes that municipalities may use their regulatory
powers over churches solely for the purposes of promoting health, safety, morals, or
the general welfare of the community.") (citation omitted).
149. Id. (citing in support of regulation Messiah Baptist Church v. County of
Jefferson, 359 F.2d 820, 828 (10th Cir. 1988); First Assembly of God v. City of Alex-
andria, 739 F.2d 942, 944 (4th Cir. 1984); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d
729, 738 (11th Cir. 1983); and against regulation W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
150. 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo. 1976) (en banc).
151. Id. at 585 ("Considering the definitions of the terms used in the zoning ordi-
nance, supra, it clearly appears that the concept common to all is that the principal
residents of places called rectories, parish houses, convents, and monasteries, are
people who have the religious ministry as their regular and primary vocation as dis-
tinguished from avocation."). This case is a good example of why Missouri needed
RFRA to augment its constitutional protections.
152. City of Kansas City v. Baird, 63 S.W. 495 (Mo. 1901).
153. 63 S.W. 495 (Mo. 1901).
154. Id. at 495. Mrs. Baird's view of healing, in the mind of the court, had no
bearing on the ordinance which required the reporting of all known cases of diphthe-
ria. Id. The mandatory reporting obligation in no way interfered with her exercise of
religion as it related to treatment of disease.
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Walton v. Walton, 155 the court of appeals held that a contempt order against a
husband who failed to pay court-ordered maintenance was a constitutionally
permissible imposition on religious exercise. 56 In State v. Pride,5 7 the court
of appeals failed to find an abuse of discretion where a trial judge refused to
accommodate the defendant's religious practices when scheduling a trial.'
51
City of Louisiana v. Bottoms 59 sheds some light on the exceptions pro-
vided in Article I, Section 5 of the Missouri Constitution. In that case a
young black minister was convicted of a breach of peace violation when the
"Hallelujahs" and "Amens" generated by his religious service between seven
and nine-thirty in the evening were heard by neighbors two blocks away.
160
The court of appeals was willing to convict a clergyman for using "foul and
obscene language in the pulpit,"' 61 or for creating excessive noise in violation
of an ordinance, 162 but stopped short of allowing a conviction on the facts in
155. 789 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
156. Id. at 66-67. Citing Penner v. King, 695 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. 1985) as founda-
tion, the court held:
Even if, in the case at bar, enforcing the court's order for the payment of
maintenance and attorney's fees could be considered an inroad on reli-
gious liberty, the state has ample justification. It is of the utmost impor-
tance for the state to maintain a system that strives for the orderly and
civilized dissolution of a family unit. When that unit is dissolved, the
state is rightfully concerned that all parties be treated fairly and be given
an opportunity, to the fullest extent possible, to continue their lives in an
independent fashion without the assistance of public funds to maintain a
decent standard of living.
Id. at 67.
157. 1 S.W.3d 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
158. Id. at 505-08. This case is important because the resolution of the free exer-
cise claim was argued using a federal RFRA precedent, but was decided under Smith
and its rational basis standard of review for neutral state actions. Id. at 505-06 ("The
Free Exercise Clause precludes all governmental regulations on beliefs, but the gov-
ernment may, under certain circumstances, impinge on a [sic] individual's actions in
accordance with those beliefs in exercising the power to proscribe conduct.") (citing
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)); Id. at 507 ("The balancing test
used in Gilliam was consistent with that required by [federal RFRA.] That Act was,
however, invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in City ofBoerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997)."). This case would now fall under Missouri's RFRA, which
would reverse the result.
159. 300 S.W. 316 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
160. Id. at 317.
161. Id. at 318 ("In fact, there are cases in the books, though from other jurisdic-
tions, which establish conclusively that the transgressor may not shield himself be-
hind the vestments of the clergy when brought to task for the use of foul and obscene
language in the pulpit.") (citing Delk v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W. 1129 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1915); Holcombe v. State, 62 S.E. 647 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908)).
162. Id. ("Likewise the beating of a drum upon the streets, no permit having been
secured from the proper officer, has been held to be a breach of the peace, even
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question. 163 A subsequent opinion by the Missouri Attorney General' 64 cites
Bottoms in response to a local prosecutor's request for guidance in similar but
less innocent circumstances.1 6F The advisory opinion also refers to a federal
court decision citing Bottoms with approval'" and advises the local prosecu-
tor to exercise his discretion.'
67
B. Missouri's RFRA in Light of Free Exercise
and No-Establishment Cases
The primary goal of every RFRA is to safeguard the exercise of reli-
gious practice. Protecting behavior motivated by religious conviction, even
in the face of general laws to the contrary, does not normally stir up contro-
versy. The real difficulty in RFRA analysis is in drawing the line which di-
vides the legitimate exercise of governmental power from the protected exer-
cise of religious liberty.
though done in the performance of a religious service, when the statute expressly
provided that it should be unlawful for any person to beat a drum, except by com-
mand of a military official having authority therefor.") (citing State v. White, 5 A.
828 (N.H. 1886)).
163. Id. ("The case at bar, however, presents a far different situation. Here defen-
dant stands charged, not with the use of obscene or indecent language, and not with
having performed any act expressly prohibited by the ordinance, unless the latter be
so construed as to comprehend and regulate the volume of sound that may be em-
ployed in a lawfully conducted church service.... That the city fathers, in the enact-
ment of such ordinance, intended that it should be given such effect, we cannot be-
lieve.").
164. 69 Op. Mo. Att'y Gen. 1 (Sept. 21, 1950).
165. Id. at 1-5. The question presented was: "Does a religious meeting which
continues until 11:00, 12:00 or 1:00 o'clock at night and conducte [sic] in such a
manner that loud and unusual noises emanate from their gathering constitute a peace
disturbance to adjoining neighbors, and if so, who are the proper persons to make
defendants thereto?" Id. at 1.
166. Id. at 5 (discussing Minersville Sch. Dist. V. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3rd Cir.
1939), rev'd by 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Bar-
nett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
167. Id. at 7. The opinion concludes with this advice to the prosecutor:
Whether the facts stated in your letter constitute a breach of the peace, as
contemplated by Section 4636 R.S. Mo. 1939, would depend upon all the
circumstances attending said religious meeting, including whether or not
the neighborhood, or any family or any persons have been disturbed in
their peace. It is a matter within the discretion of the Prosecuting Attor-
ney as to the form of action, if any, that may be filed and as to who shall
be made defendants therein.
2004]
29
Hanson: Hanson: Missouri's Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURILA WREVIEW
Considering the requirement that the state action in question be of gen-
eral applicability,1 68 it is improbable that there would be a conflict between
the application of RFRA and Missouri's no-establishment provisions. A law
of general applicability will not, by definition, either force an individual to
support a religion with which they do not agree or extend state funds for a
religious purpose to any particular religious entity or enterprise.169 Any at-
tempt to plead RFRA in a situation involving an action impermissible under
Missouri's no-establishment provisions would be defeated on state constitu-
tional grounds. 170  RFRA is concerned with, and limited to, religious free
exercise cases.' 71
168. RFRA is designed to deal with laws that affect religion incidentally. For
instance, the legal drinking age for Missouri has nothing to do with religion on its
face, but in application places the aura of illegality over communion services in Chris-
tian denominations that use alcoholic wine as a part of the rite. Laws that specifically
target religious practices are dealt with under Free Exercise Clause analysis, not
RFRA. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
169. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint:
Validations and Ramifications, 18 J.L. & POL. 445 (2002). In answer to the allegation
that RFRA protection provides an impermissible benefit to religious organizations,
Professor Esbeck explains:
Structure, to be sure, often has the laudable but indirect consequence of
enlarging the field of operation for the exercise of individual liberties. It
does this by compelling the various branches of the government (legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial) to stay confined within their proper limits.
However, the immediate object of structure is the management of power:
a dividing, dispersing, and balancing of the various prerogatives of the na-
tion's [or state's] sovereignty. Not every exercise of power that exceeds a
structural restraint will result in an injury to an individual. Lack of injury
or harm, however, does not discount the fact that a constitutional restraint
was exceeded.
Id. at 455. Applying this Establishment Clause analysis to RFRA reinforces the mu-
tually exclusive nature of this statute and the no-establishment provisions in Mis-
souri's constitution. RFRA is a statutory prohibition on certain state actions, just the
opposite of the type of government activity enjoined by the no-establishment sections.
170. This would be accomplished in one of three ways: 1) the supremacy of a
state constitutional provision over a legislative act; 2) the supremacy of the federal
Establishment Clause as applied to Missouri law by the Fourteenth Amendment; and
3) the invalidity of a claim under Missouri's RFRA requiring the state to actively
favor oppose religion.
171. RFRA, then, "compel[s] the various branches of the government (legislative,
executive, and judicial) to stay confined within their proper limits," thus "enlarging
the field of operation for the exercise of [religion]." Esbeck, supra note 169, at 455.
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C. Missouri's RFRA Exceptions in Light of
the Free Exercise Exceptions
The civil rights exception in Missouri's RFRA mirrors one application
of Missouri's constitutional free exercise exception for "acts of licentious-
ness."'172 Any claim that racist behavior is protected by either Missouri's
constitution or RFRA will ultimately fail as being an impermissible applica-
tion of religious belief.' 73 It must be emphasized, however, that religious
belief-as distinct from practice-is fully protected regardless of the unsa-
vory nature of the belief.'
4
Likewise, the remaining constitutional exceptions in Article I, section 5
provide guidance for courts in determining what interests are compelling
enough to satisfy RFRA. The "good order" exception, in Missouri's constitu-
tional cases, allows the government to control disturbances of the peace with-
out violating RFRA. 75 The "health and safety" exception allows vital regula-
tion of the medical profession in particular and governs situations protecting
the public in general from disease or injury.176 Finally, the exception protect-
ing the rights of others from religious behavior provides a rather broad cate-
gory within which the courts may find an array of compelling interests rang-
ing from RFRA's child support exception to conflicts involving spousal sup-
port or other monetary judgments against a party wanting to take religious
vows of poverty. 1
77
172. Another area in which this exception will be significant deals with relig-
iously motivated sexual behavior. Communal living involving group sexuality as
well as Wiccan or Neo-Pagan rites involving outdoor nudity and sexually related
activity may well be found within the pale of government regulation as "acts of licen-
tiousness."
173. Even without the civil rights exception in RFRA, the courts would certainly
find government suppression of racial discrimination to be a compelling interest.
174. The government is never permitted to regulate the thoughts and beliefs of a
citizen. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) ("The gov-
ernment 'cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling
a person's private thoughts."') (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566
(1969)). The expression of these thoughts and beliefs is only slightly more open to
government oversight. Id. ("The government may suppress speech for advocating the
use of force or a violation of law only if 'such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."')
(quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). RFRA operates in the
third tier, where religious belief translates into action.
175. For these situations, Bottoms and the subsequent Attorney General Opinion
provide the courts with some insight. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
176. The Baird case is the key precedent for this exception. See supra notes 153-
54 and accompanying text.
177. The Walton case involved an alimony judgment against an ex-husband which
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D. Missouri's RFRA in Context
With the history of the federal RFRA and that of eleven states with their
own versions of the Act serving as a guide, Missouri has ample case law with
which to supplement its own jurisprudence respecting religion. The follow-
ing discussion poses some plausible religious disputes or claims and their
possible solutions under Missouri's RFRA.
1. Standard RFRA Scenarios
Suppose an Orthodox Jew loses his job in a layoff and seeks unem-
ployment benefits. While receiving these benefits, he has little success in
finding suitable work except for a company that has offered him a position
which matches his training and experience but requires him to work the late
night shift every Friday. 17 If the state terminates unemployment benefits for
failure to accept the position, 179 this individual will have a claim against the
state under RFRA.180 This is RFRA applied to the situation in Sherbert v.
Verner.' 
8 1
Interest in increasing the age range of compulsory school attendance is
apparent in recent legislative activity. 8 2 This change would serve the twin
goals of increasing the percentage of high school graduates and keeping teen-
178. This arrangement would cause an impossible conflict for this individual since
the Sabbath begins at sundown on Friday evening and continues until sundown Satur-
day. This poses for such an individual a choice between taking the job and violating
his faith, or turning down the job as a matter of conscience and losing his benefits.
179. The assumption made for the sake of the hypothetical is that the rules gov-
erning unemployment benefits would require acceptance of an offered position within
the training and experience level of the unemployed individual. If the unemployment
compensation rules make provision for religious sentiment, then RFRA is not in-
voked. However, the presence of RFRA assures protection of religious exercise when
the rule of general applicability fails to so provide.
180. The plaintiff would have to plead a RFRA claim with sufficient evidence to
demonstrate a burden on the exercise of the plaintiff's religion. Articulating the im-
possible choice between observing the Sabbath and taking the job would be a plead-
ing sufficient to shift the burden of demonstrating a compelling interest to the gov-
ernment.
181. See 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that termination of Seventh Day Advent-
ist's worker compensation benefits for failure to take a job which required Saturday
work was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause).
182. Senate Bills 968 and 969 (2004), which took effect on August 28, 2004,
replaced Missouri Revised Statute Sections 167.031 and 167.051. S. 968 & 969,
92nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (2003). The changes made to Section 167.031.6 allow
metropolitan school districts to raise the compulsory attendance age to seventeen
should they so choose. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031.6 (Supp. 2004). The above men-
tioned hypothetical assumes a similar law which applies to the entire state.
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agers off the streets during the workday.18 3 If the compulsory school age
were raised to 18 in an area which included Amish families, the situation
changes significantly. RFRA would provide these Amish families an excep-
tion to such laws because the statutory educational requirements are unduly
restrictive as to 17 year old boys who are generally learning agrarian skills
with their fathers rather than studying math, English, and history for 1000
hours a year.184 This is RFRA applied to the situation in Wisconsin v.
Yoder. 1
85
Suppose a citation is issued to a Pentecostal church for a violation of a
city noise ordinance during a week-long revival. The city would be required
to show that noise control is a compelling interest and that the ordinance is
not unduly restrictive. While a case like this would be dependent to some
degree on the facts, the Bottoms case and the subsequent Attorney General
opinion would prove helpful. 186 While this fact pattern will generally favor
the church, it is conceivable that some noise disturbances arising from public
worship could cross the line previously drawn by Missouri's constitution and
make enforcement of the ordinance proper under RFRA.1
8 7
2. Defining "Compelling Governmental Interest"
Zoning ordinances and building codes provide good examples of what
does or does not constitute a "compelling governmental interest." Zoning
ordinances are a powerful tool for local governments in managing their inter-
est in real estate and economic development. However, when the economic
interests of city planners collide with a religious institution's plans to build a
house of worship, the government must demonstrate a "compelling inter-
183. An alternative to compulsory school attendance is home school which re-
quires the parent to log 1000 hours of course work, 600 hours of which must be in
core subject areas. Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031.2(2)(b) (2000). Compulsory school
attendance age according to Mo. REv. STAT. § 167.031.1 is between seven and six-
teen years.
184. The reason for not continuing education beyond the eighth grade in many
Amish communities is based on their religious beliefs concerning leading lives of
simplicity. For young Amish men, the more important skills to be learned during the
teen years include woodworking, construction, and agriculture. Requiring compli-
ance with the home school statute in lieu of public school attendance for these fami-
lies would be unduly restrictive under the relevant circumstances.
185. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that compulsory school attendance laws in-
volving Amish students between age 14 and 16 were a violation of the Free Exercise
Clause).
186. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
187. For instance, noise levels that disturb neighbors after ten o'clock at night
would more likely favor the city's case than a complaint called in at eight o'clock.
Also, loud singing and religious exclamations are most certainly protected, whereas
screaming or shrieking which disturbs the neighborhood is more suspect. See supra
notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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est." 1 88 Missouri courts have already decided that the interests involved in
zoning ordinances do not rise to the level of a "compelling governmentalinterest."' 89
On the other hand, building codes are generally enacted to ensure public
health and safety. 19° The design, structural, and material requirements found
in these codes often make certain building projects impossibly expensive.
For example, an Islamic congregation wishes to build a mosque with adjacent
prayer minaret. The local building code requires a particular design, particu-
lar structural reinforcements, and particular quality materials before the mina-
ret will be approved by the inspector. In this case, the safety interests accom-
plished by the building code are compelling enough to uphold the general
rule,19 even if the cost of compliance effectively prohibits the erection of the
mosque and minaret.1 92 The same analysis applies to fire prevention equip-
ment and emergency lighting requirements imposed on facilities constructed
by religious institutions for religious purposes. 193
188. Building a facility for the purpose of conducting worship would obviously be
an exercise of religion. A closer case would be the building of a homeless shelter or
safe-house by a religious organization for the purpose of conducting a social ministry.
189. Vill. Lutheran Church v. City of Ladue, 935 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996) ("Village Lutheran I") (citing Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve
Coeur, 230 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959) in holding that power delegated to municipalities
for zoning did not extend to religious land use).
190. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 89.020.1 (2000). Use of police power in the
areas of health, safety, morals or the general welfare rises to the level of a compelling
interest, thereby permitting government regulation of religious land use. See Vill.
Lutheran Church, 935 S.W.2d at 722. ("The Supreme Court stated that municipalities
have regulatory power over churches under their police power, but that power is
purely limited to safety regulation."); see also Vill. Lutheran Church v. City of Ladue,
997 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) ("Village Lutheran II") ("[M]unicipalities
may use their regulatory powers over churches solely for the purposes of promoting
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community.").
191. This assumes that the building code is not open to attack for being pretextual
or artificially strict so as to single out religion for regulation. See Church of the Lu-
kumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
192. See Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1995)
(quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).
193. The municipality's interest in the orderly evacuation of a building in case of
emergency makes a requirement of emergency lighting legitimate. The interest in
preventing a fire disaster makes sprinkler systems and other fire prevention and detec-
tion device requirements a prudent regulation. These requirements will undoubtedly
add to construction costs and may prevent some religious bodies from building or
adding to structures used for worship. A more difficult case involves regulations
requiring handicap accessibility for houses of worship.
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3. Defining "Not Unduly Restrictive Considering
the Relevant Circumstances"
Even when a "compelling governmental interest" is present, the means
of accomplishing that purpose must also meet the RFRA standard. For in-
stance, the government has a "compelling interest" in regulating alcohol con-
sumption by persons under the age of twenty-one. 194 When applied to alco-
holic wine used in the Catholic sacrament of the Eucharist, however, this
general prohibition falls short of being "not unduly restrictive under the rele-
vant circumstances."'195 A closer case might involve the use of marijuana by
members of the Rastifarian religion.' 96 Significant factors in evaluating "the
relevant circumstances" in this case include the frequency of ritual marijuana
use, the age of the participants, and the quantity of drug consumed.
Another possible scenario involves a state university policy with respect
to transfer credits and degrees.' 97 Assuming state universities have a "com-
pelling interest" in maintaining the quality and integrity of the education they
provide, a policy which accomplishes that purpose by recognizing only edu-
cational institutions accredited by a particular accrediting agency to the ex-
clusion of all others would have to survive RFRA's means-to-ends analy-
sis.198 If an alternative means of evaluation could vouch for the academic
194. The goals of this regulation generally include reduction in alcohol-related
injuries and fatalities due to use of alcohol by immature persons, reduction in alcohol-
ism rates in the population as a whole, and health concerns related to the introduction
of alcohol into still-developing bodies.
195. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.302.1(2) (Supp. 2004). Prohibiting a minor from par-
ticipating in the holiest portion of the mass simply because a sip of alcoholic wine is
involved surely qualifies as "unduly restrictive."
196. See United States v. Jefferson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (N.D. Ind. 2001), aff'd
317 F.3d 768. While the courts had no problem avoiding RFRA in this case, claims
by Rastafarians who use marijuana only once a month under very controlled circum-
stances could provide a closer case.
197. One such policy was discussed by the University of Missouri's Faculty
Council on June 13, 2002, and passed unanimously by that body on July 25, 2002.
University of Missouri, Faculty Council, Meeting Minutes (June 13, 2002 and July
25, 2002), available at http://web.missouri.edu/-mufcwww/minutes/index.html.
Under this new policy, the University only accepts credits and/or degrees from "re-
gionally accredited" institutions. Id. No mention is made in the minutes of the June
13th meeting as to how international students would be treated under this policy.
198. In the University of Missouri scenario, the University would have to show
that rejection of all accrediting agencies not under the umbrella of "regional accredita-
tion" would be "not unduly restrictive under the relevant circumstances." "The rele-
vant circumstances" would include the academic record of students from disfavored
institutions compared to those from "regionally accredited" ones.
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excellence of a religious college, 199 then the state university's exclusionary
policy would be unduly restrictive and violate RFRA.20 0
4. Defining "Exercise of Religion"
Another issue that must be resolved by the courts is the scope of "exer-
cise of religion" as defined by the statute. Suppose that a county has adopted
an ordinance concerning poultry processing that requires certain facilities and
procedures, and which is meant to decrease the health hazards posed by sub-
standard poultry farms and processing sites. Would adherents of Santaria be
exempted from these rules where they kept chickens near their place of wor-
ship for use in animal sacrifices? In this case, the sacrifice of animals would
qualify as an exercise of religion under RFRA and the county would bear the
burden of meeting the RFRA standard.2"'
The state of Georgia recently settled a law suit over its faith-based initia-
202tive program. As part of the settlement, Georgia now requires religious
institutions to forego their Title VII exemptions regarding employment to
199. Many Bible colleges have decided not to pursue "regional accreditation" for
several reasons, many of which are religious. For one college's experience, see Lynn
Gardner, OZARK CHRISTIAN COLLEGE: A VISION OF TEACHING THE WORD OF CHRIST
IN THE SPIRrr OF CHRIST 253-60 (1992). As a result, the Association of Biblical
Higher Education ("ABHE"), formerly the American Association of Bible Colleges,
was formed to provide credentials for these educational institutions. See generally
John Mostert, THE AABC STORY: FORTY YEARS WITH THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF BIBLE COLLEGES (1986). See also http://abhe.gospelcom.net/abherecognition.htm
(July 26, 2004). The ABHE is recognized as a "national accrediting agency" by the
U.S. Dept. of Education, the same recognition enjoyed by the American Bar Associa-
tion's accrediting agency, which regulates law schools across the country. See
http://www.ed.gov/admins/fmaid/accred/accreditation_pg6.html (last visited July 26,
2004). This is one example of an alternative method of evaluating the academic stan-
dards of a religious college or university.
200. The difficulties for AABC schools under RFRA involve standing and meet-
ing the threshold requirement. Should a student from an AABC accredited school
establish standing to sue and demonstrate a burden on his exercise of religion, then
the University of Missouri bears the burden of producing evidence and persuading the
fact finder that this policy is "not unduly restrictive under the relevant circumstances."
201. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993). The Lukumi case involved a Free Exercise Clause violation by a municipality
which had created health ordinances intended to prevent animal sacrifice. Id. In the
hypothetical above, the ordinance was designed to serve general health purposes
without reference to religion, thus making it subject to RFRA analysis as a law of
general applicability.
202. For a column outlining the issues involved, see Felix Hoover, Case Opens
Hiring-Bias Debate Again, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 2002, at 1E.
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qualify for funding.2°3 This arrangement forces religious institutions to
choose between funding for legitimate social programs and adherence to reli-
gious belief, a choice that burdens their exercise of religion.204 Should Mis-
souri adopt such a policy, the government would be forced to demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest for the policy which is not unduly restric-
five. Discontent among individuals or groups not eligible for employment
under religious hiring guidelines does not rise to the level of a compelling
governmental interest, and therefore the policy would violate RFRA.
5. The Burden of Producing Evidence and the Burden of Persuasion
Missouri's RFRA requires the plaintiff to show only an "exercise of re-
ligion" which is burdened by a law of general applicability.2 °5 Once this
showing has been made, the state must "demonstrate[]" a "compelling gov-
ernmental interest" and that the law is "not unduly restrictive considering the
relevant circumstances." 2°6 The burden shifting nature of the statute is sig-
nificant in that a tie goes to the plaintiff.
207
Suppose a Muslim inmate alleges that group strip-searches violate a
tenet of his religion which requires that he not expose his genitals to strang-
ers.208 Suppose further that the inmate has indicated his willingness to submit
to strip-searches conducted by male prison personnel, and by female person-
nel in emergency circumstances.2°9 The state is required to produce more
than a bald assertion that a compelling interest in safety and efficient prison
administration exists. Rather, evidence must be presented to convince the
fact finder that the strip-search policy actually accomplishes the asserted in-
terest in a manner that is "not unduly restrictive" to the inmate's exercise of
203. For an editorial explaining the settlement and its ramifications, see Stephen
Lazarus, Regress, Not Progress, in Georgia, CAP. CoMMENT., Nov. 17, 2003, avail-
able at http://www.cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$1125.
204. This lose-lose choice is similar to the dilemma condemned by the Supreme
Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
205. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.302.1 (Supp. 2003).
206. Id. § 1.302. 1.
207. Missouri's RFRA spares the plaintiff from producing evidence or explaining
policy when the government is better situated to bear such a burden. The plaintiff is
only required to explain how his or her religious practices are being burdened and
what law is burdening those practices.
208. See Collins v. Scott, 961 F. Supp. 1009, 1014 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
209. Id.
210. In Collins, the court did not apply RFRA because the inmate failed to show
that his objection was motivated by a central tenet of his religion. Id. This standard is
not required under Missouri's RFRA. In Missouri, a practice based on a sincerely
held religious belief is enough to require the state to withstand RFRA scrutiny.
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religion. 211 The government's failure to produce or persuade would result in
a judgment for the inmate.
6. The Civil Rights Legislation Exception
The language of the civil rights exception includes any classification
protected under civil rights laws, not simply race.212 The question to be liti-
gated, then, is how to determine which laws are "civil rights" laws and which
are simply laws of general applicability.
213
Assume a state school adopts a policy of nondiscrimination including
homosexual individuals as a protected class. The policy prevents any entity
not willing to sign and comply with the policy from using school facilities or
participating in school functions. Could a religious institution raise a RFRA
claim because of its exclusion from recruiting opportunities for failure to sign
or comply with the policy? 214 One of the questions in this fact pattern that
must be resolved by the courts is whether a non-discrimination policy at an
educational institution qualifies as a "state or local civil rights law." While
the state school is exposed to RFRA claims under the general provision,
2 15
the non-discrimination policy does not qualify as a state or local civil rights
law, as required by the civil rights exception. Only state and local govern-
ments are capable of creating state and local civil rights law. Therefore, poli-
cies at a state-sponsored institution do not rise to the level of local law regard-
less of their intended civil rights purposes.
7. The Weapons Exception
Missouri's RFRA has spared the courts from wrestling with the possibil-
ity of school children wearing ceremonial knives to school. The exception
211. Under these facts, the prison must demonstrate that having female guards
conduct strip-searches is not unduly restrictive in the prison context.
212. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.307.2 (Supp. 2003).
213. The nature of the body creating the law in question becomes important.
There are several entities that qualify as governmental authorities under RFRA that do
not qualify as "state or local" bodies capable of enacting a "civil rights law." One
distinction involves the line between governments and their agencies. A different
distinction involves distinguishing judicial and legislative "civil rights law."
214. This is a very different scenario from the one raised by military recruiters.
Under this fact pattern, a completely private entity has set hiring standards on the
basis of the religious belief embraced by the organization. The policy, as applied to
this firm, is forcing the firm to choose between violating its religious practice or being
excluded from a limited public forum.
215. In order to become applicable, Missouri's RFRA simply requires that a
"governmental authority" restrict the exercise of religion. See Mo. REv. STAT. §
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allowing the state to regulate the use and transport of weapons notwithstand-
ing their religious significance was inspired by the Ninth Circuit decision
requiring an exception to be made for children of the Sikh religion who
wanted to wear ceremonial knives.2 16 In a school-shootings environment,
especially after September 11, 2001, the General Assembly created this safety
and security exception to RFRA.
2 17
A problem posed by this exception may surface in the prison context.
The Greek Orthodox Church uses a ceremonial knife when conducting its
sacrament of the Eucharist.218 The knife is possessed and utilized only by the
priest performing the ceremony, but it is essential to performing the rite.2 9 If
the exception concerning weapons is rigidly followed, it is possible that the
prohibition of knives in prisons could effectively deny Greek Orthodox in-
mates the most important sacrament of their faith.220
8. The Child Support Exception
The child support exception 221 was created to ensure the maintenance of
children after a divorce and limit the number of children supported by state
aid due to divorce.222 While these are worthy goals, the impact on the reli-
216. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
217. The language of Missouri Revised Statute Section 1.307.3 (Supp. 2003)
effectively exempts weapons laws from the strict scrutiny standard. This carve out of
RFRA's protection in favor of state police power is indicative of current sensitivity to
matters of public safety and security.
218. In the Greek Orthodox tradition, the Eucharist is the holiest rite of the church
and is central to its entire worship service. Rev. Thomas Fitzerald, The Sacraments,
available at http://www.goarch.org/print/en/ourfaith/article7l05.asp (last visited July
27, 2004).
219. The bread in the rite becomes the "Lamb of God" which is sacrificed by
means of the "Lance," a double-edged knife used only by the priest. Sacred Utensils,
in THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY 437-38 (Ken Parry et al.
eds., 1999); Fotios K. Litsas, Ph.D., A Dictionary of Orthodox Terminology, available
at http://www.goarch.org/print/en/ourfaith/article8049.asp (last visited July 27, 2004).
220. This outcome is unfortunate in that the interests of all concerned could plau-
sibly be met. Prison officials could ensure their safety interests by providing an envi-
ronment in which the priest is able to administer the elements to the prisoners without
the prisoners having access to the sacred utensils.
221. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.307.3.
222. See Walton v. Walton, 789 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). The Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Western District stated the state's interest by writing:
Even if, in the case at bar, enforcing the court's order for the payment of
maintenance and attorney's fees could be considered an inroad on reli-
gious liberty, the state has ample justification. It is of the utmost impor-
tance for the state to maintain a system that strives for the orderly and
civilized dissolution of a family unit. When that unit is dissolved, the
state is rightfully concerned that all parties be treated fairly and be given
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gious liberty of noncustodial parents is significant. Suppose a divorced man
decides to re-evaluate his life goals and chooses to enter holy orders, with its
attending vow of poverty. The child support exception would prevent him
from taking this step, no matter how sincere his desire, by requiring that he
pay child support at the amount agreed upon by the court.223 If he chooses to
take the vow, he would be in contempt of court for non-payment of the sup-
port payments and could face incarceration.
224
9. The Medical Care for Minors Exception
The right of a parent to make decisions on behalf of her child is gener-
ally honored by the law. This is true, to a large degree, in the area of medical
treatment.225 However, lawmakers were uncomfortable with extending this
prerogative too far on religious grounds.226 For instance, if a child has a seri-
ous but not life-threatening medical need, the parents are free to decide what
medical treatment, if any, is appropriate, including faith healing and prayer.
227
However, the medical care for minors exception allows the state to force a
blood transfusion, for example, to save the life of a child whose parents are
Jehovah's Witnesses and who have a religious objection to blood transfu-
an opportunity, to the fullest extent possible, to continue their lives in an
independent fashion without the assistance of public funds to maintain a
decent standard of living.
Id. at 67.
223. While the court may not force a non-custodial parent to earn a particular
income, it does impute income to the parent based on that parent's earning capacity.
Vendegna v. Vendegna, 125 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). In this scenario,
the father would likely have an imputed income based on his training and experience,
and his child support payments would be calculated from this figure.
224. In a curious twist of fate, the religious father in this hypothetical runs a
greater risk of incarceration than the proverbial "dead-beat dad." The religious father,
because he refuses to earn an income for religious reasons, may be more susceptible
to incarceration as a method of punishment than the father who is unemployed or
underemployed.
225. In Missouri, parents are empowered to give consent to medical treatment on
behalf of their children by Missouri Revised Statute Section 431.061 (2000). The
statute proscribing child endangerment in Missouri carefully states that "nonmedical
remedial treatment" does not qualify as criminal behavior by a parent or guardian.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 568.050.2 (2000). For a Missouri case involving a court ordered
blood transfusion for a seventeen year old Jehovah's Witness, see In re W.M., Jr., 823
S.W.2d 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
226. See Byrd, supra note 103, at 9 ("[A]n adult can refuse medical treatment for
religious reasons, and.., a parent can choose faith based healing for their children,
but only if the child's medical condition is not life threatening.") (emphasis added).
227. Id. Representative Byrd adds, "This provision was an effort to codify the
current status of case law on this issue." Id.
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sions. 22 A more difficult question arises when a child, perhaps as old as age
15, personally expresses a desire to refuse blood under similar circum-229
stances.
10. RFRA in Missouri Prisons
The prison provision in Missouri's RFRA clarifies the act's application
in the prison context. The prison provision points out that the safety and se-
curity of both the inmate and the facility are matters that should be considered
when evaluating "the relevant circumstances." 230 Therefore, policies restrict-
ing the possession of candles, 23 1 Native American medicine bags, 232 or other
religious items may be warranted in prisons. Rather than being an exception
to the rule, this subsection serves more as a guide to applying the rule as it
relates to the prison system.233
Legitimate RFRA claims in the prison context, however, are both possi-
ble and probable. Access to clergy, accommodation of prayer times, and
dietary peculiarities are all potential issues for Muslim inmates.234 Also left
228. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D.
Wash. 1967), aff'd 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (memorandum opinion).
229. The difficult question in this fact pattern is the age at which a child is capable
of personal religious belief. If the courts too freely accuse parents of "brainwashing"
their children, they run the risk of deciding matters "respecting an establishment of
religion" in violation of the Establishment Clause. If the courts take the profession of
religious belief at face value, they are faced with (1) the risk of allowing the parents to
exercise undue influence over their adolescent children, and (2) the difficult task of
drawing a line regarding how old is old enough for the formation of sincere and in-
formed religious opinions. Adults, of course, have the right to refuse medical treat-
ment for any reason.
230. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.307.4 (Supp. 2003).
231. See Brower v. Nuckles, No. 98-1276, 1999 WL 435173, at *1-2 (6th Cir.
June 18, 1999) (Catholic inmate's challenge of policy against open flame candles was
defeated by City of Boerne decision holding RFRA unconstitutional and prison offi-
cials' change of policy which mooted his claim for equitable relief); Doty v. Lewis,
995 F. Supp. 1081 (D. Ariz. 1998) (Satanist inmate lost his challenge to prison policy
denying him candles, a tapestry, and two books after City of Boerne decision found
RFRA unconstitutional).
232. See Craddick v. Duckworth, 113 F.3d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
prison officials failed to meet burden of persuasion with respect to least restrictive
means of maintaining prison security).
233. The plain language of this section indicates a legislative intent to protect
prison ministry and inmate exercise of religion without undermining the safety and
security of all involved. This balance has been effectively struck by the courts in the
various jurisdictions which have already implemented RFRA, and is provided in the
statute to placate Department of Corrections concerns about RFRA. See supra notes
45-52, 79, 86, 90, 93-94 and accompanying text.
234. Misunderstanding of various religious traditions is often at the core of reli-
gious liberty disputes, especially in prisons. While it would be naive to say that relig-
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open for litigation are the limits on availability and acceptability of religious
reading materials.235 One court, ruling under the federal RFRA, has already
held that a limit of 25 religious books is permissible.
236
11. Court Rules of Procedure as Laws of General Applicability
An interesting question raised by the Missouri Constitution involves the
validity of court rules which burden the exercise of religion. Article V, Sec-
tion 5 of the Missouri Constitution authorizes the courts to "establish rules
relating to ractice, procedure and pleading for all courts and administrative
tribunals."2 17 However, the courts do not have the constitutional authority to
enact rules that "change substantive rights."238 The courts have previously
ruled that the substantive rights of citizens are regulated solely by the legisla-
ture, and court rules of procedure that conflict with those rights are invalid.239
ion is never used as a pretext for other ends, prison officials are just as capable of
alleging pretext as inmates where legitimate religious practices are involved. The
more unfamiliar or esoteric the religious practice in question, the more likely it is to
be resisted by officials.
235. The reading materials which are most often the source of litigation involve
either racial supremacy themes or anti-government sentiments. See Weir v. Nix, 114
F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997); Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1108-10 (E.D. Wis.
1996); Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp 398, 400 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Lawson v. Dug-
ger, 844 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994), rev'd by sub nom Lawson v. Singletary, 85
F.3d 502 (11 th Cir. 1996).
236. Weir, 114 F.3d at 820-22. This case involved a "strict fundamentalist" in-
mate who challenged a prison's policies regarding the 25 book limit imposed on in-
mates, a limit of 3 hours per week for worship, and the denial of fellow inmate par-
ticipation in a baptismal service. Id. at 819-20.
237. MO. CONST. art. V., § 5.
238. Id.
239. See Glasby v. State, 739 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1985). In discussing the court's
rule making power in this case, the Missouri Supreme Court found:
The constitution's express limitation that rules should "not change sub-
stantive rights" prohibits the use of such power to create jurisdiction. A
court's power and authority to take cognizance of and to adjudicate a case,
i.e., jurisdiction, is not self-generated: it is bestowed upon the court by
the constitution and by legislative enactment. The rules of practice and
procedure are but a means to establish order and stability in the exercise
of the jurisdiction which is vested in the courts by the people and by their
representatives. In the absence of such jurisdiction, the rules have no ap-
plication.
Id. at 771. See also State v. Martin, 602 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). Concern-
ing this same rule making authority, the court of appeals concluded:
Whether, as a matter of law, a defendant can be convicted of a given
crime is a matter of substance not procedure. MAI-CR and MAI-CR2d
are products of the Supreme Court's rule making authority. They cannot
make criminal that which is not.
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This seems to indicate that a court rule burdening the exercise of religion is
subject to RFRA.2 4
Consider a Presbyterian church in which the minister has been accused
of child abuse by one of its parishioners. The elders at the Presbytery exer-
cise church discipline policies and procedures in an effort to determine the
validity of the claim and respond appropriately to the complaint.24' After
these proceedings take place, the parents of the alleged victim file an inten-
tional tort claim against the minister and a negligent supervision of clergy
claim against the local church, as well as the Presbytery and the denomina-
tion.242  During discovery, the plaintiffs attorney requests a copy of all
documents generated during the church discipline investigation and adjudica-
243tion. In compelling this discovery, the trial judge would burden the con-
gregation's exercise of religion by attaching the risk of discovery requests to
the exercise of church discipline.244 The same information desired by the
Id. at 779 n.l1.
240. Statutory protection of religious exercise in excess of First Amendment pro-
tection under the federal constitution creates a substantive right. A rule of discovery
promulgated by the Missouri Supreme Court is a rule of general applicability by a
governmental entity. Applying Glasby and Martin, then, the courts are barred by
RFRA from applying a discovery rule that burdens the exercise of religion absent a
showing of a compelling governmental interest accomplished by means "not unduly
restrictive considering the relevant circumstances."
241. One of the difficulties to be resolved by the courts involves the statutory
definition of "exercise of religion" as applied to, inter alia, church discipline. One
possible solution is to require either a religious text or institutional by-laws which
define the process and scope of church discipline before allowing a mere allegation of
religious exercise to qualify under the definition. However, the statutory definition
does not require a religious practice to be central or essential to the particular reli-
gious system, Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.302.2 (Supp. 2003), making this solution somewhat
problematic.
242. The Missouri Supreme Court dealt with the issues of negligent supervision of
clergy and intentional failure to supervise clergy in Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d
239 (Mo. 1997). The court concluded that religious institutions are not exempt from
these claims, but only "[i]f neutral principles of law can be applied without determin-
ing questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice." Id. at 246. If a court should
decide that it can appropriately adjudicate a claim for negligent supervision of clergy,
then RFRA and its effect on the rules of discovery would provide another layer of
protection for the religious institution.
243. Mo. R. Civ. P. 58.01. For Missouri's rule on failure to produce documents,
see Mo. R. Civ. P. 61.01(d).
244. While rarer now than in previous generations, church discipline is mandated
by religious text in many religious systems and serves the purpose of maintaining
doctrinal purity and settling of internal conflict. Allowing transcripts of these pro-
ceedings to become discoverable in civil litigation would have a chilling effect on the
exercise of disciplinary procedures, frustrating the purposes they serve. This is not to
say that persons involved in the proceedings could not be deposed or otherwise dis-
covered by either party in a civil suit.
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plaintiffs is available by other means so disclosure is "unduly restrictive un-
der the relevant circumstances. ' 245  The denominational officials would
surely be able to avoid discovery of all the documents in question under Mis-
souri's RFRA.2
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri, while the twelfth state to enact RFRA, is the first state to mod-
ify the means-to-ends standard imposed upon the government. Another dif-
ference between Missouri's RFRA and those of other states is the handful of
exceptions provided within the statute. In addition to a decade of case law in
other jurisdictions applying both federal and state RFRAs, Missouri also has
state constitutional precedent which will aid the courts as they implement
RFRA's general rule and its exceptions. The end result is increased protec-
tion for religious liberties with extra flexibility granted to the government in a
few highly sensitive areas.
JAMES A. HANSON
245. Because the plaintiff in a civil suit would have knowledge concerning the
procedures of the defendant church, identifying witnesses to be deposed would not be
an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff. On the other hand, forcing disclosure of
documents related to church discipline provides the plaintiff with a discovery short-
cut which imposes a significant burden on the religious institution's use of church
discipline for religious purposes.
246. Applying Glasby, RFRA denies jurisdiction to the courts with respect to the
disclosure of the transcript under the rules of discovery. The rules may not create
jurisdiction where none has been granted by the Missouri Constitution or the legisla-
ture. Glasby v. State, 739 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Mo. 1985). Likewise, the church, rely-
ing on Martin, could not be held in contempt for failure to disclose because the rule
cannot make unlawful an act which is protected by statute. State v. Martin, 602
S.W.2d 772, 779 n.lI (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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